* feat(llm): add native Novita AI provider via OpenAI-compatible endpoint
Wire Novita AI (https://api.novita.ai/openai/v1) as a first-class LLM
provider, following the same pattern used for DeepSeek/HuggingFace/NanoGPT:
dispatched through the existing OpenAIAdapter, resolved via NOVITA_API_KEY,
with a default model, model catalog entries, config/setup wiring, and
regression tests.
* fixup(llm): use deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731 as the second Novita model
Swap the curated Novita model catalog's second entry from
qwen/qwen3-coder-30b-a3b-instruct to deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731 per
requested model selection. Verified live against api.novita.ai/openai/v1/models.
* fixup(llm): replace superseded DeepSeek Flash id with current Pro flagship
QA flagged that deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731 has been superseded in the
live Novita catalog; deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro-0813 is now the current
serving DeepSeek flagship. Swap the second Novita model catalog entry
accordingly.
---------
Co-authored-by: jax-novita <jax-novita@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(arsenal): add subdomain-takeover classifier + fingerprint table
Pure, I/O-free detection logic split into src/arsenal/takeover.ts so it is fully
unit-testable without DNS or network:
- TAKEOVER_FINGERPRINTS: curated CNAME + unclaimed-resource-body signatures for 15
high-frequency services (S3, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Azure, Fastly, Shopify, Netlify, ...)
- classifySubdomainTakeover(): conservative verdict (confirmed / potential / none) driven by
a dangling CNAME and/or a service body fingerprint; no cross-service false matches
- renderTakeoverReport(): human-readable output block
* feat(arsenal): register subdomain_takeover_check built-in + bump tool count 108->109
- New keyless, self-contained built-in tool 'subdomain_takeover_check' (recon): resolves the
CNAME, checks whether the target still resolves (dangling), fetches the live body via the
scope-gated targetFetch, and classifies via classifySubdomainTakeover. Emits a real finding.
- Added to the Recon operator's default toolkit so the swarm can reach it (operator-toolkits
coverage invariant).
- Bumped the advertised arsenal size 108 -> 109 in lockstep across the count-honesty test,
README, and verify-claims (73 adapters + 36 built-in).
* test(arsenal): cover subdomain_takeover_check (classifier matrix + mocked DNS/fetch e2e)
- classifySubdomainTakeover decision matrix: confirmed via body fingerprint, confirmed via
dangling nxdomain-prone CNAME, potential (known service, no confirmation), potential
(dangling unknown), none (no CNAME / resolves clean), and no cross-service false matching
- renderTakeoverReport output shape
- end-to-end handler test with DNS + fetch mocked, driving the confirmed S3 path
Add user and developer documentation plus Pagenary docsite publishing support.
Includes Getting Started, Developer Guide, API and MCP references, Pagenary tenant metadata, npm scripts for sync/build/check/serve, and validation coverage for the generated docsite.
Closes#102
* chore(ingest): pin web-tree-sitter@0.25.10 + tree-sitter-wasms@0.1.13; add multilang-ingest design docs
* feat(ingest): multi-language grammar registry (web-tree-sitter, 8 langs, fail-open); 100% cov
* feat(ingest): language-aware param-name splitter (py/go/ts/java/c); 100% cov
* feat(ingest): tree-sitter CodeBlock extractor with wall-clock parse budget + fail-open
* feat(ingest): cross-lang sinks + multilang config + wire tree-sitter into ingestRepository (sync)
* feat(ingest): repoint white-box production callers to multilang config + prod regression test
* server-init-wiring: load multi-language grammars once at bootstrap
initGrammars() runs after LLM init, before app.listen. Internally
fail-open (never rejects): on failure the grammar registry stays empty
and ingest falls back to the Python regex parser.
* adversarial-tests: hostile-input hardening for untrusted target source
Malformed per-language source, wrong-language content, binary/non-UTF8,
empty, unicode identifiers, 20k-func large file (wall-clock budget),
deeply nested input, and a symlink-loop crawl — all must fail-open, never
throw or spin. Drives parseFileMultiLang + ingestRepository/crawl.
* readme-status + docs: flip white-box status to multi-language ingest
README source-code rows now state web-tree-sitter multi-language ingest
(fail-open to Python regex). whitebox.ts scope caveat + no-source error
message updated off the stale Python-only wording.
* coverage-setup: enforce 100% coverage gate on the three new ingest files
vitest.config.ts adds a coverage-only block (v8, perFile thresholds=100)
scoped to ts-grammars.ts, param-split.ts, ts-parse.ts. Test discovery and
env stay on defaults. Edited files gate on new-branch coverage via the
regression suites; the server.ts initGrammars bootstrap line is the
documented smoke-covered carve-out.
* review: fix WASM heap leak, language-scoped fail-open, sink recall/precision
Adversarial security + strict code review (two independent subagents)
returned one blocking bug and several correctness findings; remediated:
BLOCKING #1 — native WASM memory leak: web-tree-sitter Tree/Parser objects
were never .delete()'d. Both reviewers reproduced a process-global wedge:
after ~7 large parses the shared WASM heap exhausts, every subsequent parse
aborts (caught by fail-open), and non-Python ingest silently returns []
forever. Fix: free the tree in a finally; delete the parser in resetParser.
Regression test parses ~8MB through the real shared parser 12x.
regex, which mis-parses brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks (wrong line
spans, lost methods). Now non-.py fail-open returns [] (honest absence); the
Python regex only ever runs on .py. Isolated ts-parse-fallback test.
http(s).request, axios(config), C exec-family); negative lookbehind stops
bare system(/popen(/fetch( from matching Python receivers (os.system etc.
still matched, corpus rankings unchanged). Recall+precision tests added.
operator sees non-Python degradation.
(one-line call-graph edges, no decorators, C++ member methods).
* review round 2: fix sink-regex regressions, real timeout test, deterministic leak guard
Third review round (correctness + security re-attack + test-quality) against
the round-1 fixes surfaced issues in the fixes themselves; remediated:
- Sink-regex regressions I introduced: (1) my fetch lookbehind dropped
window.fetch/this.fetch (top JS SSRF idiom) — reverted to \bfetch\(;
(2) bare .Get/.Post/.Do flagged db.Get/cache.Get/queue.Do as SSRF —
receiver-qualified to [Cc]lient. Recall+precision tests cover both;
regex is ReDoS-free (timed).
- Placebo leak test: the 12x function-dense loop did NOT wedge the parser
on machines with heap headroom (proven: passed with tree.delete removed).
Replaced with a deterministic vi.spyOn(Tree.prototype,'delete') assertion,
verified RED without the fix.
- Real (non-mocked) parse-timeout test: parseFileMultiLang gains an injectable
budgetMs; a 0ms budget drives the real progressCallback cancellation to [].
- runWhiteboxAnalysis swap now has coverage (spy on orchestrator.run) so the
2nd production caller can't silently revert to the Python-only config.
- Un-vacuoused weak tests: unicode now asserts the extracted block; nested/
wrong-language wrapped in invariants() + timing bounds.
- CI now runs npm run test:coverage (the 100% gate was defined but unenforced).
- Security: documented maxFileBytes as the control bounding a single parse's
peak WASM memory below the 2GB heap-abort ceiling.
- Stale 'fail-open to Python regex' docs fixed (ts-parse, whitebox, server,
adversarial); circular-import note added; temp-dir cleanup; honest coverage
wording in spec + config.
* docs(ingest): align fallback-contract text with the shipped language-scoped fail-open
Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the design docs + one ts-grammars comment
still described the pre-implementation 'fall back to the Python regex'
model for non-Python files. The shipped contract is language-scoped: .py
uses parseFile; any non-.py file with a missing/unsupported/failed grammar
or a parse timeout returns [] (never the Python regex, which would mis-parse
brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks). Updated every stale reference in
multilang-ingest-spec.md, multilang-ingest-plan.md, and ts-grammars.ts so
the docs match the security boundary. Docs/comment only — no code change.
* fix(test): make the ReDoS wall-clock guard robust under coverage instrumentation
Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the CI step this PR adds (npm run
test:coverage = vitest run --coverage) runs the full suite under V8
coverage, and that overhead pushes the pathological-brace DoS timing guard
in local-agent-tool-calling.test.ts:69 over its <300ms bound (320 < 300
fails on CI). Raise the bound to 1000ms — still 2x below the ~2100ms
quadratic-ReDoS regression it guards against, so it fails hard if the
regression returns, but no longer false-fails under coverage/slow CI.
Chose the reviewer's option (a) (robust bound) over scoping test:coverage,
so the gate stays a simple full-suite run and no test-file enumeration can
rot. Verified: npm run test:coverage is green and the 3 new files stay at
100%.
* fix(ingest): cover pointer-returning C functions
---------
Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com>
The quickstart tells users to run `npx tempest config` to switch to the local
provider, but there is no `config` subcommand — the CLI exposes `interactive`
(default), `setup`, `status`, `test`, and `models`. The "Change default
provider" flow lives in the default `interactive` command, so the correct
invocation is `npx tempest`.
- Add Dockerfile with Node.js 18 alpine build
- Add docker-compose.yml with environment configuration
- Add docs/DOCKER.md deployment guide
- Update README.md with Docker quick start section
- Server binds to 0.0.0.0:3333 for external access
- UI available at http://localhost:3333/ui/
- Volumes mounted for reports and evidence persistence
Three new category loadouts, each = arsenal + an offline-scorable benchmark, opt-in and
honestly scoped (roster marks all 🚧; pacu/frida stay catalog_only, unit-tested non-mintable):
- cloud: aws/az/gcloud + scoutsuite/cloudfox/pmapper; cloud:bench IaC-misconfig detection
- mobile: apkleaks/mobsfscan/drozer/objection/class-dump; mobile:bench static ruleset
- binary/RE: ghidra/objdump/checksec/strings/readelf/gdb; binary:bench decompiled-sink detector
Mobile/binary benches are DETECTOR REGRESSION CHECKS (rules+fixtures co-authored — a pass is a
floor, not a detection rate). No new headline numbers; verify-claims 24/24.
tsc clean; 337 tests; lint 0 errors.
The honesty pass had the hero paragraph and the benchmarks 'flex' block
restating numbers/caveats already in the Benchmarks table. State each once:
the hero drops the inline CVE-Zero deep-dive (kept in the table) and points to
#benchmarks; the flex block trims to its thesis. No claim/number changes.
Adds three coordinated capabilities and tightens two defaults on purpose — this is
safety hardening, NOT a backward-compatible drop-in (see "Tightened defaults").
Fifteen independent adversarial review passes; findings fixed and test-pinned.
- Pack-hunt safety: a strict-majority adjudicator with a comment/string/regex/
raw-string/heredoc/POD-aware cite-check (language-gated across C/C++/Py/Rust/Go/
Java/JS/TS/shell/SQL/PHP/Ruby/Perl) so a hallucinated killing-guard can't refute
a real finding — the cited comparison's operator must match source, and a
string/regex/heredoc/generic-arglist/template-interpolation is blanked before
matching. Plus a rate-limit/degraded-health tracker, a global LLM semaphore, and
a PackBoard with an atomic claim CAS + snapshot-on-emit/clone-on-ingest.
- Opt-in Kali+ arsenal (T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL, OFF by default): 35 default tools
(31 built-in + 4 external-CLI wrappers) -> 83 with the catalog armed (verify-claims
CLAIM 4). Most adapters need the underlying binary installed. metasploit / hydra /
bloodhound are never minted through the generic factory.
- Capability-approval + spicy-action gate for the NEW dangerous arsenal only
(pre-existing built-ins keep running freely): approve-once, fail-safe deny when
unattended, redacted audit trail over SSE. T3MP3ST_GATE_BUILTINS=1 extends it to
the spicy built-in probes. Audit redaction is a pure, unit-tested module.
Tightened defaults (intentional, ON by default — NOT backward-compatible):
- Egress containment: once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse
off-scope public hosts (not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private) with
SCOPE DENIED — keeps the agent on authorized scope.
- Role-specialized operator toolkits: each archetype gets a curated default tool
menu (scanner -> scan tools, exploiter -> sqli/xss/etc). Tools stay registered
team-wide; the per-role menu is the operator's working set.
UX (from live-tester feedback): a one-click "Approve & run" modal when a standard
Hunt blocks on an external-target receipt (was a dead-end); bounded-parallel
benchmark file ingestion; the deterministic mission-gate chip co-located with the
subjective SITREP pace narration (no more "behind schedule" next to a clean gate);
and click-through finding detail + evidence in the UI (was export-only).
Docs: README + INTEGRITY_LEDGER made re-derivable — honest 35/83 tool count, the
egress-containment default documented, and the Cybench number reconciled to the
single verify-claims-enforced 23/40 = 58% (dropped the stale/uncited 21 and 26).
README voice pass: killed the underselling `Successful Exploits: 0` disqualifier
(read as "never popped anything" — false, given CVE-Zero + the live disclosure
pipeline); swagger now rests on receipts, not vibes. Also corrected the operator
status — the downstream operators run the SAME real tool-backed ReAct loop as
recon (not "orchestration stubs"); the honest limit is that the coordinated swarm
is unproven (single-agent is the benchmarked path), not that they're scaffolding.
Gates: 292 tests, tsc + lint clean, verify-claims 20/20, arsenal:smoke 125/0,
disclosure-CLI self-test 11/11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
