feat(ingest): multi-language white-box ingest (web-tree-sitter) (#75)

* chore(ingest): pin web-tree-sitter@0.25.10 + tree-sitter-wasms@0.1.13; add multilang-ingest design docs

* feat(ingest): multi-language grammar registry (web-tree-sitter, 8 langs, fail-open); 100% cov

* feat(ingest): language-aware param-name splitter (py/go/ts/java/c); 100% cov

* feat(ingest): tree-sitter CodeBlock extractor with wall-clock parse budget + fail-open

* feat(ingest): cross-lang sinks + multilang config + wire tree-sitter into ingestRepository (sync)

* feat(ingest): repoint white-box production callers to multilang config + prod regression test

* server-init-wiring: load multi-language grammars once at bootstrap

initGrammars() runs after LLM init, before app.listen. Internally
fail-open (never rejects): on failure the grammar registry stays empty
and ingest falls back to the Python regex parser.

* adversarial-tests: hostile-input hardening for untrusted target source

Malformed per-language source, wrong-language content, binary/non-UTF8,
empty, unicode identifiers, 20k-func large file (wall-clock budget),
deeply nested input, and a symlink-loop crawl — all must fail-open, never
throw or spin. Drives parseFileMultiLang + ingestRepository/crawl.

* readme-status + docs: flip white-box status to multi-language ingest

README source-code rows now state web-tree-sitter multi-language ingest
(fail-open to Python regex). whitebox.ts scope caveat + no-source error
message updated off the stale Python-only wording.

* coverage-setup: enforce 100% coverage gate on the three new ingest files

vitest.config.ts adds a coverage-only block (v8, perFile thresholds=100)
scoped to ts-grammars.ts, param-split.ts, ts-parse.ts. Test discovery and
env stay on defaults. Edited files gate on new-branch coverage via the
regression suites; the server.ts initGrammars bootstrap line is the
documented smoke-covered carve-out.

* review: fix WASM heap leak, language-scoped fail-open, sink recall/precision

Adversarial security + strict code review (two independent subagents)
returned one blocking bug and several correctness findings; remediated:

BLOCKING #1 — native WASM memory leak: web-tree-sitter Tree/Parser objects
were never .delete()'d. Both reviewers reproduced a process-global wedge:
after ~7 large parses the shared WASM heap exhausts, every subsequent parse
aborts (caught by fail-open), and non-Python ingest silently returns []
forever. Fix: free the tree in a finally; delete the parser in resetParser.
Regression test parses ~8MB through the real shared parser 12x.

regex, which mis-parses brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks (wrong line
spans, lost methods). Now non-.py fail-open returns [] (honest absence); the
Python regex only ever runs on .py. Isolated ts-parse-fallback test.

http(s).request, axios(config), C exec-family); negative lookbehind stops
bare system(/popen(/fetch( from matching Python receivers (os.system etc.
still matched, corpus rankings unchanged). Recall+precision tests added.

operator sees non-Python degradation.

(one-line call-graph edges, no decorators, C++ member methods).

* review round 2: fix sink-regex regressions, real timeout test, deterministic leak guard

Third review round (correctness + security re-attack + test-quality) against
the round-1 fixes surfaced issues in the fixes themselves; remediated:

- Sink-regex regressions I introduced: (1) my fetch lookbehind dropped
  window.fetch/this.fetch (top JS SSRF idiom) — reverted to \bfetch\(;
  (2) bare .Get/.Post/.Do flagged db.Get/cache.Get/queue.Do as SSRF —
  receiver-qualified to [Cc]lient. Recall+precision tests cover both;
  regex is ReDoS-free (timed).
- Placebo leak test: the 12x function-dense loop did NOT wedge the parser
  on machines with heap headroom (proven: passed with tree.delete removed).
  Replaced with a deterministic vi.spyOn(Tree.prototype,'delete') assertion,
  verified RED without the fix.
- Real (non-mocked) parse-timeout test: parseFileMultiLang gains an injectable
  budgetMs; a 0ms budget drives the real progressCallback cancellation to [].
- runWhiteboxAnalysis swap now has coverage (spy on orchestrator.run) so the
  2nd production caller can't silently revert to the Python-only config.
- Un-vacuoused weak tests: unicode now asserts the extracted block; nested/
  wrong-language wrapped in invariants() + timing bounds.
- CI now runs npm run test:coverage (the 100% gate was defined but unenforced).
- Security: documented maxFileBytes as the control bounding a single parse's
  peak WASM memory below the 2GB heap-abort ceiling.
- Stale 'fail-open to Python regex' docs fixed (ts-parse, whitebox, server,
  adversarial); circular-import note added; temp-dir cleanup; honest coverage
  wording in spec + config.

* docs(ingest): align fallback-contract text with the shipped language-scoped fail-open

Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the design docs + one ts-grammars comment
still described the pre-implementation 'fall back to the Python regex'
model for non-Python files. The shipped contract is language-scoped: .py
uses parseFile; any non-.py file with a missing/unsupported/failed grammar
or a parse timeout returns [] (never the Python regex, which would mis-parse
brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks). Updated every stale reference in
multilang-ingest-spec.md, multilang-ingest-plan.md, and ts-grammars.ts so
the docs match the security boundary. Docs/comment only — no code change.

* fix(test): make the ReDoS wall-clock guard robust under coverage instrumentation

Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the CI step this PR adds (npm run
test:coverage = vitest run --coverage) runs the full suite under V8
coverage, and that overhead pushes the pathological-brace DoS timing guard
in local-agent-tool-calling.test.ts:69 over its <300ms bound (320 < 300
fails on CI). Raise the bound to 1000ms — still 2x below the ~2100ms
quadratic-ReDoS regression it guards against, so it fails hard if the
regression returns, but no longer false-fails under coverage/slow CI.

Chose the reviewer's option (a) (robust bound) over scoping test:coverage,
so the gate stays a simple full-suite run and no test-file enumeration can
rot. Verified: npm run test:coverage is green and the 3 new files stay at
100%.

* fix(ingest): cover pointer-returning C functions

---------

Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com>

README.md

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Offensive security sits behind years of practice and expensive tooling. The bet
 | 🕸️ **Web apps** | Black-box, external-attacker recon → exploit (XBEN suite) | ✅ Stable |
 | 🚩 **CTF** | Hint-free, sandbox-jailed solves (Cybench) | ✅ Stable |
 | 🤖 **Robotics / OT / embedded** | Coordinated-disclosure pipeline for OSS vuln hunting (OSV + live-PoC + refuter) | ✅ Pipeline stable |
-| 📂 **Source code** | White-box repo analysis with blind master-builder decomposition | ⚠️ Python-only ingest |
+| 📂 **Source code** | White-box repo analysis with blind master-builder decomposition | ✅ Multi-language ingest (web-tree-sitter) |
 | 💰 **Smart contracts** | Damn Vulnerable DeFi | ⚠️ reproduction, not novel discovery |
 | ☁️ **Cloud (IaC)** | Misconfig-detection benchmark (`cloud:bench`) + opt-in cloud arsenal (aws/az/gcloud + scoutsuite/cloudfox/pmapper; pacu gated) | 🚧 IaC-misconfig scaffolding — live-cloud exploitation not yet benchmarked |
 | 📱 **Mobile** | Built-in static analyzer (manifest misconfig + secret/cleartext detection, `mobile:bench`) + opt-in arsenal (mobsfscan/objection/drozer; frida gated) | 🚧 static-detection scaffolding — dynamic exploitation not benchmarked |
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ The framework is an 8-operator kill chain, and this table won't blow smoke about
 | Arsenal, MCP server, HTTP API | ✅ Stable | 35 built-in tools by default; 108 with the opt-in `T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL` (+73 adapters, with dangerous/catalog-only drivers — metasploit, hydra, pacu, frida — behind narrow approved paths rather than generic execution) — both counts re-derive via `verify-claims`. `security_recon` over MCP |
 | Egress-scope containment | ✅ Stable (on by default) | once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse off-scope public hosts — not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private (`SCOPE DENIED`) — a tightened default, not a bare tool runner |
 | Coordinated-disclosure pipeline | ✅ Stable | OSV novelty + live PoC + refuter panel + CVSS; drafts only, a human sends |
-| White-box source analysis | ⚠️ Experimental | Python-only regex ingest; multi-model decomposition costs more tokens, not fewer |
+| White-box source analysis | ⚠️ Experimental | Multi-language ingest via web-tree-sitter (Python/JS/TS/Go/Java/C/C++); Python retains its regex parser, while other languages fail open to no extracted blocks; multi-model decomposition costs more tokens, not fewer |
 | DeFi (Damn Vulnerable DeFi) | ⚠️ Experimental | reproduces known exploit classes; not novel discovery |
 | Exploiter / Infiltrator / Exfiltrator / Ghost | ⚠️ Experimental | run the real tool-backed ReAct loop (same engine as recon); unproven as a coordinated swarm — single-agent is the benchmarked path, live swarm exploitation still unreliable |
 | Advanced modules (cloud, persistence, swarm, cognition) | 🚧 Planned | interface-only in `src/stubs/` |