Add user and developer documentation plus Pagenary docsite publishing support.
Includes Getting Started, Developer Guide, API and MCP references, Pagenary tenant metadata, npm scripts for sync/build/check/serve, and validation coverage for the generated docsite.
Closes#102
* chore(ingest): pin web-tree-sitter@0.25.10 + tree-sitter-wasms@0.1.13; add multilang-ingest design docs
* feat(ingest): multi-language grammar registry (web-tree-sitter, 8 langs, fail-open); 100% cov
* feat(ingest): language-aware param-name splitter (py/go/ts/java/c); 100% cov
* feat(ingest): tree-sitter CodeBlock extractor with wall-clock parse budget + fail-open
* feat(ingest): cross-lang sinks + multilang config + wire tree-sitter into ingestRepository (sync)
* feat(ingest): repoint white-box production callers to multilang config + prod regression test
* server-init-wiring: load multi-language grammars once at bootstrap
initGrammars() runs after LLM init, before app.listen. Internally
fail-open (never rejects): on failure the grammar registry stays empty
and ingest falls back to the Python regex parser.
* adversarial-tests: hostile-input hardening for untrusted target source
Malformed per-language source, wrong-language content, binary/non-UTF8,
empty, unicode identifiers, 20k-func large file (wall-clock budget),
deeply nested input, and a symlink-loop crawl — all must fail-open, never
throw or spin. Drives parseFileMultiLang + ingestRepository/crawl.
* readme-status + docs: flip white-box status to multi-language ingest
README source-code rows now state web-tree-sitter multi-language ingest
(fail-open to Python regex). whitebox.ts scope caveat + no-source error
message updated off the stale Python-only wording.
* coverage-setup: enforce 100% coverage gate on the three new ingest files
vitest.config.ts adds a coverage-only block (v8, perFile thresholds=100)
scoped to ts-grammars.ts, param-split.ts, ts-parse.ts. Test discovery and
env stay on defaults. Edited files gate on new-branch coverage via the
regression suites; the server.ts initGrammars bootstrap line is the
documented smoke-covered carve-out.
* review: fix WASM heap leak, language-scoped fail-open, sink recall/precision
Adversarial security + strict code review (two independent subagents)
returned one blocking bug and several correctness findings; remediated:
BLOCKING #1 — native WASM memory leak: web-tree-sitter Tree/Parser objects
were never .delete()'d. Both reviewers reproduced a process-global wedge:
after ~7 large parses the shared WASM heap exhausts, every subsequent parse
aborts (caught by fail-open), and non-Python ingest silently returns []
forever. Fix: free the tree in a finally; delete the parser in resetParser.
Regression test parses ~8MB through the real shared parser 12x.
regex, which mis-parses brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks (wrong line
spans, lost methods). Now non-.py fail-open returns [] (honest absence); the
Python regex only ever runs on .py. Isolated ts-parse-fallback test.
http(s).request, axios(config), C exec-family); negative lookbehind stops
bare system(/popen(/fetch( from matching Python receivers (os.system etc.
still matched, corpus rankings unchanged). Recall+precision tests added.
operator sees non-Python degradation.
(one-line call-graph edges, no decorators, C++ member methods).
* review round 2: fix sink-regex regressions, real timeout test, deterministic leak guard
Third review round (correctness + security re-attack + test-quality) against
the round-1 fixes surfaced issues in the fixes themselves; remediated:
- Sink-regex regressions I introduced: (1) my fetch lookbehind dropped
window.fetch/this.fetch (top JS SSRF idiom) — reverted to \bfetch\(;
(2) bare .Get/.Post/.Do flagged db.Get/cache.Get/queue.Do as SSRF —
receiver-qualified to [Cc]lient. Recall+precision tests cover both;
regex is ReDoS-free (timed).
- Placebo leak test: the 12x function-dense loop did NOT wedge the parser
on machines with heap headroom (proven: passed with tree.delete removed).
Replaced with a deterministic vi.spyOn(Tree.prototype,'delete') assertion,
verified RED without the fix.
- Real (non-mocked) parse-timeout test: parseFileMultiLang gains an injectable
budgetMs; a 0ms budget drives the real progressCallback cancellation to [].
- runWhiteboxAnalysis swap now has coverage (spy on orchestrator.run) so the
2nd production caller can't silently revert to the Python-only config.
- Un-vacuoused weak tests: unicode now asserts the extracted block; nested/
wrong-language wrapped in invariants() + timing bounds.
- CI now runs npm run test:coverage (the 100% gate was defined but unenforced).
- Security: documented maxFileBytes as the control bounding a single parse's
peak WASM memory below the 2GB heap-abort ceiling.
- Stale 'fail-open to Python regex' docs fixed (ts-parse, whitebox, server,
adversarial); circular-import note added; temp-dir cleanup; honest coverage
wording in spec + config.
* docs(ingest): align fallback-contract text with the shipped language-scoped fail-open
Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the design docs + one ts-grammars comment
still described the pre-implementation 'fall back to the Python regex'
model for non-Python files. The shipped contract is language-scoped: .py
uses parseFile; any non-.py file with a missing/unsupported/failed grammar
or a parse timeout returns [] (never the Python regex, which would mis-parse
brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks). Updated every stale reference in
multilang-ingest-spec.md, multilang-ingest-plan.md, and ts-grammars.ts so
the docs match the security boundary. Docs/comment only — no code change.
* fix(test): make the ReDoS wall-clock guard robust under coverage instrumentation
Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the CI step this PR adds (npm run
test:coverage = vitest run --coverage) runs the full suite under V8
coverage, and that overhead pushes the pathological-brace DoS timing guard
in local-agent-tool-calling.test.ts:69 over its <300ms bound (320 < 300
fails on CI). Raise the bound to 1000ms — still 2x below the ~2100ms
quadratic-ReDoS regression it guards against, so it fails hard if the
regression returns, but no longer false-fails under coverage/slow CI.
Chose the reviewer's option (a) (robust bound) over scoping test:coverage,
so the gate stays a simple full-suite run and no test-file enumeration can
rot. Verified: npm run test:coverage is green and the 3 new files stay at
100%.
* fix(ingest): cover pointer-returning C functions
---------
Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com>
The quickstart tells users to run `npx tempest config` to switch to the local
provider, but there is no `config` subcommand — the CLI exposes `interactive`
(default), `setup`, `status`, `test`, and `models`. The "Change default
provider" flow lives in the default `interactive` command, so the correct
invocation is `npx tempest`.
- Add Dockerfile with Node.js 18 alpine build
- Add docker-compose.yml with environment configuration
- Add docs/DOCKER.md deployment guide
- Update README.md with Docker quick start section
- Server binds to 0.0.0.0:3333 for external access
- UI available at http://localhost:3333/ui/
- Volumes mounted for reports and evidence persistence
Three new category loadouts, each = arsenal + an offline-scorable benchmark, opt-in and
honestly scoped (roster marks all 🚧; pacu/frida stay catalog_only, unit-tested non-mintable):
- cloud: aws/az/gcloud + scoutsuite/cloudfox/pmapper; cloud:bench IaC-misconfig detection
- mobile: apkleaks/mobsfscan/drozer/objection/class-dump; mobile:bench static ruleset
- binary/RE: ghidra/objdump/checksec/strings/readelf/gdb; binary:bench decompiled-sink detector
Mobile/binary benches are DETECTOR REGRESSION CHECKS (rules+fixtures co-authored — a pass is a
floor, not a detection rate). No new headline numbers; verify-claims 24/24.
tsc clean; 337 tests; lint 0 errors.
The honesty pass had the hero paragraph and the benchmarks 'flex' block
restating numbers/caveats already in the Benchmarks table. State each once:
the hero drops the inline CVE-Zero deep-dive (kept in the table) and points to
#benchmarks; the flex block trims to its thesis. No claim/number changes.
Adds three coordinated capabilities and tightens two defaults on purpose — this is
safety hardening, NOT a backward-compatible drop-in (see "Tightened defaults").
Fifteen independent adversarial review passes; findings fixed and test-pinned.
- Pack-hunt safety: a strict-majority adjudicator with a comment/string/regex/
raw-string/heredoc/POD-aware cite-check (language-gated across C/C++/Py/Rust/Go/
Java/JS/TS/shell/SQL/PHP/Ruby/Perl) so a hallucinated killing-guard can't refute
a real finding — the cited comparison's operator must match source, and a
string/regex/heredoc/generic-arglist/template-interpolation is blanked before
matching. Plus a rate-limit/degraded-health tracker, a global LLM semaphore, and
a PackBoard with an atomic claim CAS + snapshot-on-emit/clone-on-ingest.
- Opt-in Kali+ arsenal (T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL, OFF by default): 35 default tools
(31 built-in + 4 external-CLI wrappers) -> 83 with the catalog armed (verify-claims
CLAIM 4). Most adapters need the underlying binary installed. metasploit / hydra /
bloodhound are never minted through the generic factory.
- Capability-approval + spicy-action gate for the NEW dangerous arsenal only
(pre-existing built-ins keep running freely): approve-once, fail-safe deny when
unattended, redacted audit trail over SSE. T3MP3ST_GATE_BUILTINS=1 extends it to
the spicy built-in probes. Audit redaction is a pure, unit-tested module.
Tightened defaults (intentional, ON by default — NOT backward-compatible):
- Egress containment: once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse
off-scope public hosts (not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private) with
SCOPE DENIED — keeps the agent on authorized scope.
- Role-specialized operator toolkits: each archetype gets a curated default tool
menu (scanner -> scan tools, exploiter -> sqli/xss/etc). Tools stay registered
team-wide; the per-role menu is the operator's working set.
UX (from live-tester feedback): a one-click "Approve & run" modal when a standard
Hunt blocks on an external-target receipt (was a dead-end); bounded-parallel
benchmark file ingestion; the deterministic mission-gate chip co-located with the
subjective SITREP pace narration (no more "behind schedule" next to a clean gate);
and click-through finding detail + evidence in the UI (was export-only).
Docs: README + INTEGRITY_LEDGER made re-derivable — honest 35/83 tool count, the
egress-containment default documented, and the Cybench number reconciled to the
single verify-claims-enforced 23/40 = 58% (dropped the stale/uncited 21 and 26).
README voice pass: killed the underselling `Successful Exploits: 0` disqualifier
(read as "never popped anything" — false, given CVE-Zero + the live disclosure
pipeline); swagger now rests on receipts, not vibes. Also corrected the operator
status — the downstream operators run the SAME real tool-backed ReAct loop as
recon (not "orchestration stubs"); the honest limit is that the coordinated swarm
is unproven (single-agent is the benchmarked path), not that they're scaffolding.
Gates: 292 tests, tsc + lint clean, verify-claims 20/20, arsenal:smoke 125/0,
disclosure-CLI self-test 11/11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joseph Magly