43 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# Scope And Authorization Model
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T3MP3ST is built for authorized security research, owned assets, labs, bug bounty scopes, internal red-team work, and evidence-backed defensive reporting.
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The core rule is simple: a mission can be imaginative, aggressive, and adversarial, but the system must preserve scope, evidence, and operator accountability.
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## Authority Layers
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| Layer | Purpose | Example |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Human intent | The plain-language mission contract | "We own this staging API. Find high-impact risks and produce a fix plan." |
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| Scope receipt | Proof that a target and action class are allowed | `command_execution` on `local-host`, or `network_request` for a named range |
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| Tool gate | Adapter execution mode | `safe_command`, `receipt_required`, `catalog_only`, `import_only` |
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| Evidence ledger | Durable proof before claims | command output, screenshot, report, note, receipt |
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| Finding ledger | Claim plus impact and fix | severity, confidence, evidence IDs, acceptance criteria |
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| Retest | Validation before promotion | queued, passed, failed, blocked |
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| Memory proposal | Human-reviewed durable learning | no silent self-modification |
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## Execution Modes
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- `safe_command`: local-read or lab-safe command, still logged and evidence-oriented.
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- `receipt_required`: active, networked, credential-adjacent, or otherwise risky command.
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- `catalog_only`: known capability that should not run through generic command execution.
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- `import_only`: evidence can be imported, but collection stays outside generic execution.
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## Non-Negotiables
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- No third-party target without explicit scope.
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- No production writes without a named approval.
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- No copying raw secrets, tokens, credentials, private keys, or recovered passwords into evidence.
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- No generic execution surface for broad exploitation or credential tooling.
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- Findings need evidence and retests before they become confident claims.
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- Memory needs operator acceptance before it becomes durable.
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## Reviewer Checklist
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- Can I tell what target is in scope?
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- Can I tell which action class is approved?
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- Can I tell which tool output supports each claim?
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- Can I retest the claim?
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- Can a nontechnical stakeholder understand the risk and next action?
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- Can a technical stakeholder reproduce the evidence?
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