Joseph Magly
0c35a833b9
Add user and developer documentation plus Pagenary docsite publishing support. Includes Getting Started, Developer Guide, API and MCP references, Pagenary tenant metadata, npm scripts for sync/build/check/serve, and validation coverage for the generated docsite. Closes #102
2.6 KiB
2.6 KiB
title, summary, description, audience, category, status, source, sourcePath, updated
| title | summary | description | audience | category | status | source | sourcePath | updated | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scope and Authorization | Rules of engagement, authorization receipts, evidence, and retest boundaries. | Rules of engagement, authorization receipts, evidence, and retest boundaries. |
|
operator | current | T3MP3ST repository | docs/SCOPE_AND_AUTHORIZATION.md | 2026-07-20 |
Scope And Authorization Model
T3MP3ST is built for authorized security research, owned assets, labs, bug bounty scopes, internal red-team work, and evidence-backed defensive reporting.
The core rule is simple: a mission can be imaginative, aggressive, and adversarial, but the system must preserve scope, evidence, and operator accountability.
Authority Layers
| Layer | Purpose | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Human intent | The plain-language mission contract | "We own this staging API. Find high-impact risks and produce a fix plan." |
| Scope receipt | Proof that a target and action class are allowed | command_execution on local-host, or network_request for a named range |
| Tool gate | Adapter execution mode | safe_command, receipt_required, catalog_only, import_only |
| Evidence ledger | Durable proof before claims | command output, screenshot, report, note, receipt |
| Finding ledger | Claim plus impact and fix | severity, confidence, evidence IDs, acceptance criteria |
| Retest | Validation before promotion | queued, passed, failed, blocked |
| Memory proposal | Human-reviewed durable learning | no silent self-modification |
Execution Modes
safe_command: local-read or lab-safe command, still logged and evidence-oriented.receipt_required: active, networked, credential-adjacent, or otherwise risky command.catalog_only: known capability that should not run through generic command execution.import_only: evidence can be imported, but collection stays outside generic execution.
Non-Negotiables
- No third-party target without explicit scope.
- No production writes without a named approval.
- No copying raw secrets, tokens, credentials, private keys, or recovered passwords into evidence.
- No generic execution surface for broad exploitation or credential tooling.
- Findings need evidence and retests before they become confident claims.
- Memory needs operator acceptance before it becomes durable.
Reviewer Checklist
- Can I tell what target is in scope?
- Can I tell which action class is approved?
- Can I tell which tool output supports each claim?
- Can I retest the claim?
- Can a nontechnical stakeholder understand the risk and next action?
- Can a technical stakeholder reproduce the evidence?