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Joseph Magly 0c35a833b9 docs: add usage and developer documentation
Add user and developer documentation plus Pagenary docsite publishing support.

Includes Getting Started, Developer Guide, API and MCP references, Pagenary tenant metadata, npm scripts for sync/build/check/serve, and validation coverage for the generated docsite.

Closes #102
2026-07-20 12:59:53 -04:00

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---
title: "Scope and Authorization"
summary: "Rules of engagement, authorization receipts, evidence, and retest boundaries."
description: "Rules of engagement, authorization receipts, evidence, and retest boundaries."
audience: ["operator", "security-reviewer"]
category: "operator"
status: "current"
source: "T3MP3ST repository"
sourcePath: "docs/SCOPE_AND_AUTHORIZATION.md"
updated: "2026-07-20"
---
# Scope And Authorization Model
T3MP3ST is built for authorized security research, owned assets, labs, bug bounty scopes, internal red-team work, and evidence-backed defensive reporting.
The core rule is simple: a mission can be imaginative, aggressive, and adversarial, but the system must preserve scope, evidence, and operator accountability.
## Authority Layers
| Layer | Purpose | Example |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Human intent | The plain-language mission contract | "We own this staging API. Find high-impact risks and produce a fix plan." |
| Scope receipt | Proof that a target and action class are allowed | `command_execution` on `local-host`, or `network_request` for a named range |
| Tool gate | Adapter execution mode | `safe_command`, `receipt_required`, `catalog_only`, `import_only` |
| Evidence ledger | Durable proof before claims | command output, screenshot, report, note, receipt |
| Finding ledger | Claim plus impact and fix | severity, confidence, evidence IDs, acceptance criteria |
| Retest | Validation before promotion | queued, passed, failed, blocked |
| Memory proposal | Human-reviewed durable learning | no silent self-modification |
## Execution Modes
- `safe_command`: local-read or lab-safe command, still logged and evidence-oriented.
- `receipt_required`: active, networked, credential-adjacent, or otherwise risky command.
- `catalog_only`: known capability that should not run through generic command execution.
- `import_only`: evidence can be imported, but collection stays outside generic execution.
## Non-Negotiables
- No third-party target without explicit scope.
- No production writes without a named approval.
- No copying raw secrets, tokens, credentials, private keys, or recovered passwords into evidence.
- No generic execution surface for broad exploitation or credential tooling.
- Findings need evidence and retests before they become confident claims.
- Memory needs operator acceptance before it becomes durable.
## Reviewer Checklist
- Can I tell what target is in scope?
- Can I tell which action class is approved?
- Can I tell which tool output supports each claim?
- Can I retest the claim?
- Can a nontechnical stakeholder understand the risk and next action?
- Can a technical stakeholder reproduce the evidence?