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t3mp3st/.aiwg/addons/t3mp3st-maintainer/templates/public-input-threat-assessment.md
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public-input-threat-assessment Threat assessment template for public user-authored GitHub content that may contain classic manipulation or agentic attacks.

Public Input Threat Assessment

Source: <issue | PR | review | comment | commit | branch | log | screenshot | external link> Reference: <URL or #number> Assessor: <name/tool> Date: <YYYY-MM-DD>

Public Content Reviewed

Content User-Controlled Surface Notes
<body/comment/log/etc> <issue title/comment/patch/etc> <notes>

Classic Manipulation / Turing Attack Checks

Check Present Evidence
Urgency pressure or threat <yes/no> <evidence>
Flattery, social proof, or authority claim <yes/no> <evidence>
Request to skip tests, review, policy, or evidence <yes/no> <evidence>
Unsupported security or correctness claim <yes/no> <evidence>
Attempt to manipulate maintainer decision or priority <yes/no> <evidence>

Agentic Attack Checks

Check Present Evidence
Prompt injection or hidden instruction <yes/no> <evidence>
Tool-use steering or command execution request <yes/no> <evidence>
Credential, token, environment, or secret exfiltration attempt <yes/no> <evidence>
Poisoned logs, tests, screenshots, filenames, or model output <yes/no> <evidence>
Objective redirection or instruction hierarchy override <yes/no> <evidence>
Suspicious external link or attachment <yes/no> <evidence>

Security Framework Routing

Required: <yes/no>

Route used:

  • aiwg discover "<phrase>"
  • Selected artifact: <skill/rule/flow or none>

Use security-engineering routing for auth, secrets, supply chain, CI, command execution, local model behavior, disclosure handling, or repository trust decisions.

Decision

Risk: <low | medium | high>

Allowed next action:

  • <respond | audit PR | request changes | address-issues | defer | do not merge | escalate>

Required mitigations:

  • <mitigation>