Lyubomir BozhinovandJoseph Magly
151d3555c6
* chore(ingest): pin web-tree-sitter@0.25.10 + tree-sitter-wasms@0.1.13; add multilang-ingest design docs * feat(ingest): multi-language grammar registry (web-tree-sitter, 8 langs, fail-open); 100% cov * feat(ingest): language-aware param-name splitter (py/go/ts/java/c); 100% cov * feat(ingest): tree-sitter CodeBlock extractor with wall-clock parse budget + fail-open * feat(ingest): cross-lang sinks + multilang config + wire tree-sitter into ingestRepository (sync) * feat(ingest): repoint white-box production callers to multilang config + prod regression test * server-init-wiring: load multi-language grammars once at bootstrap initGrammars() runs after LLM init, before app.listen. Internally fail-open (never rejects): on failure the grammar registry stays empty and ingest falls back to the Python regex parser. * adversarial-tests: hostile-input hardening for untrusted target source Malformed per-language source, wrong-language content, binary/non-UTF8, empty, unicode identifiers, 20k-func large file (wall-clock budget), deeply nested input, and a symlink-loop crawl — all must fail-open, never throw or spin. Drives parseFileMultiLang + ingestRepository/crawl. * readme-status + docs: flip white-box status to multi-language ingest README source-code rows now state web-tree-sitter multi-language ingest (fail-open to Python regex). whitebox.ts scope caveat + no-source error message updated off the stale Python-only wording. * coverage-setup: enforce 100% coverage gate on the three new ingest files vitest.config.ts adds a coverage-only block (v8, perFile thresholds=100) scoped to ts-grammars.ts, param-split.ts, ts-parse.ts. Test discovery and env stay on defaults. Edited files gate on new-branch coverage via the regression suites; the server.ts initGrammars bootstrap line is the documented smoke-covered carve-out. * review: fix WASM heap leak, language-scoped fail-open, sink recall/precision Adversarial security + strict code review (two independent subagents) returned one blocking bug and several correctness findings; remediated: BLOCKING #1 — native WASM memory leak: web-tree-sitter Tree/Parser objects were never .delete()'d. Both reviewers reproduced a process-global wedge: after ~7 large parses the shared WASM heap exhausts, every subsequent parse aborts (caught by fail-open), and non-Python ingest silently returns [] forever. Fix: free the tree in a finally; delete the parser in resetParser. Regression test parses ~8MB through the real shared parser 12x. regex, which mis-parses brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks (wrong line spans, lost methods). Now non-.py fail-open returns [] (honest absence); the Python regex only ever runs on .py. Isolated ts-parse-fallback test. http(s).request, axios(config), C exec-family); negative lookbehind stops bare system(/popen(/fetch( from matching Python receivers (os.system etc. still matched, corpus rankings unchanged). Recall+precision tests added. operator sees non-Python degradation. (one-line call-graph edges, no decorators, C++ member methods). * review round 2: fix sink-regex regressions, real timeout test, deterministic leak guard Third review round (correctness + security re-attack + test-quality) against the round-1 fixes surfaced issues in the fixes themselves; remediated: - Sink-regex regressions I introduced: (1) my fetch lookbehind dropped window.fetch/this.fetch (top JS SSRF idiom) — reverted to \bfetch\(; (2) bare .Get/.Post/.Do flagged db.Get/cache.Get/queue.Do as SSRF — receiver-qualified to [Cc]lient. Recall+precision tests cover both; regex is ReDoS-free (timed). - Placebo leak test: the 12x function-dense loop did NOT wedge the parser on machines with heap headroom (proven: passed with tree.delete removed). Replaced with a deterministic vi.spyOn(Tree.prototype,'delete') assertion, verified RED without the fix. - Real (non-mocked) parse-timeout test: parseFileMultiLang gains an injectable budgetMs; a 0ms budget drives the real progressCallback cancellation to []. - runWhiteboxAnalysis swap now has coverage (spy on orchestrator.run) so the 2nd production caller can't silently revert to the Python-only config. - Un-vacuoused weak tests: unicode now asserts the extracted block; nested/ wrong-language wrapped in invariants() + timing bounds. - CI now runs npm run test:coverage (the 100% gate was defined but unenforced). - Security: documented maxFileBytes as the control bounding a single parse's peak WASM memory below the 2GB heap-abort ceiling. - Stale 'fail-open to Python regex' docs fixed (ts-parse, whitebox, server, adversarial); circular-import note added; temp-dir cleanup; honest coverage wording in spec + config. * docs(ingest): align fallback-contract text with the shipped language-scoped fail-open Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the design docs + one ts-grammars comment still described the pre-implementation 'fall back to the Python regex' model for non-Python files. The shipped contract is language-scoped: .py uses parseFile; any non-.py file with a missing/unsupported/failed grammar or a parse timeout returns [] (never the Python regex, which would mis-parse brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks). Updated every stale reference in multilang-ingest-spec.md, multilang-ingest-plan.md, and ts-grammars.ts so the docs match the security boundary. Docs/comment only — no code change. * fix(test): make the ReDoS wall-clock guard robust under coverage instrumentation Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the CI step this PR adds (npm run test:coverage = vitest run --coverage) runs the full suite under V8 coverage, and that overhead pushes the pathological-brace DoS timing guard in local-agent-tool-calling.test.ts:69 over its <300ms bound (320 < 300 fails on CI). Raise the bound to 1000ms — still 2x below the ~2100ms quadratic-ReDoS regression it guards against, so it fails hard if the regression returns, but no longer false-fails under coverage/slow CI. Chose the reviewer's option (a) (robust bound) over scoping test:coverage, so the gate stays a simple full-suite run and no test-file enumeration can rot. Verified: npm run test:coverage is green and the 3 new files stay at 100%. * fix(ingest): cover pointer-returning C functions --------- Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com>
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71 lines
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node_modules/
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dist/
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.env
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*.tsbuildinfo
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# --- excluded from the published repo ---
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# raw upstream Cybench corpus (181M third-party content incl. writeups/flags/solutions — do not redistribute)
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bench/cybench/corpus-stage/
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# ephemeral docker staging (regenerated each run)
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bench/cybench/service-stage/
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# per-challenge staging dirs (contain flag.expected answer files; regenerable)
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bench/cybench/challenges/
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# XBOW/XBEN staging (1.3G third-party challenge source + .env flag files; regenerated by xbow-bench.mjs)
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bench/xbow/stage/
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bench/xbow/challenges/
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# robustness fallback dirs + artifact unpacks (regenerable)
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**/*.stale-*
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**/release_unpacked/
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# secrets / creds (belt-and-suspenders)
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.env
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.env.*
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!.env.example
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*.pem
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*.key
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# logs + python caches + os cruft
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*.log
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**/__pycache__/
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.DS_Store
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# --- coordinated-disclosure HOLD (never publish unpatched vuln detail) ---
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# Structured findings, executed PoCs/reproducers, generated disclosure packages,
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# and reporting guidance stay LOCAL until each bug is fixed/disclosed with its
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# vendor. The *tooling* that makes them (disclosure-gen, verify-finding) is
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# tracked; its *outputs* — and any reproducer code or compiled PoC binary — are not.
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# Entire wild-hunt tree = unreported-vuln hunt output (structured findings, executed
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# PoCs, generated disclosure dossiers, the results/ campaign summaries, GATE-PRECISION).
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# NONE of it ships until each bug is vendor-coordinated. The *tooling* lives in src/ +
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# scripts/; only its *outputs* live here, so ignoring the whole tree is safe (0 tracked).
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bench/wild-hunt/
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docs/disclosures/
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# Held planning docs that reference unreported vulnerabilities (pre-disclosure)
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docs/V6_PLAN.md
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# decomposition run artifacts (reports may contain unreported vulnerability analysis)
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bench/decomposition-results/
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# refusal-frontier raw responses can contain model-written toy-exploit text
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bench/refusal-frontier/
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bench/nyu/
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# local one-off key paste file (Venice etc.) — never commit
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.keys.local
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# bounty platform API credentials — never commit
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.keys.bounty.json
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# sensitive export leak-gate denylist (operator handle + embargoed disclosure
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# targets + personal vault) loaded by the exporter — never commit
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scripts/.export-denylist.local
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# --- project-local AIWG bundle source ---
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# Keep runtime/generated AIWG workspace state local. Only project-local addon
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# source is publishable.
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!.aiwg/
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.aiwg/*
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!.aiwg/addons/
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!.aiwg/addons/**
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server.pid
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# vitest v8 coverage output
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coverage/
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