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t3mp3st/src/__tests__/redact.test.ts
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t3mp3st contributorsandClaude Opus 4.8 06ffe3ef66 feat: pack-hunt safety + opt-in Kali+ arsenal + capability-approval gate + tester-feedback UX
Adds three coordinated capabilities and tightens two defaults on purpose — this is
safety hardening, NOT a backward-compatible drop-in (see "Tightened defaults").
Fifteen independent adversarial review passes; findings fixed and test-pinned.

- Pack-hunt safety: a strict-majority adjudicator with a comment/string/regex/
  raw-string/heredoc/POD-aware cite-check (language-gated across C/C++/Py/Rust/Go/
  Java/JS/TS/shell/SQL/PHP/Ruby/Perl) so a hallucinated killing-guard can't refute
  a real finding — the cited comparison's operator must match source, and a
  string/regex/heredoc/generic-arglist/template-interpolation is blanked before
  matching. Plus a rate-limit/degraded-health tracker, a global LLM semaphore, and
  a PackBoard with an atomic claim CAS + snapshot-on-emit/clone-on-ingest.
- Opt-in Kali+ arsenal (T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL, OFF by default): 35 default tools
  (31 built-in + 4 external-CLI wrappers) -> 83 with the catalog armed (verify-claims
  CLAIM 4). Most adapters need the underlying binary installed. metasploit / hydra /
  bloodhound are never minted through the generic factory.
- Capability-approval + spicy-action gate for the NEW dangerous arsenal only
  (pre-existing built-ins keep running freely): approve-once, fail-safe deny when
  unattended, redacted audit trail over SSE. T3MP3ST_GATE_BUILTINS=1 extends it to
  the spicy built-in probes. Audit redaction is a pure, unit-tested module.

Tightened defaults (intentional, ON by default — NOT backward-compatible):
- Egress containment: once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse
  off-scope public hosts (not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private) with
  SCOPE DENIED — keeps the agent on authorized scope.
- Role-specialized operator toolkits: each archetype gets a curated default tool
  menu (scanner -> scan tools, exploiter -> sqli/xss/etc). Tools stay registered
  team-wide; the per-role menu is the operator's working set.

UX (from live-tester feedback): a one-click "Approve & run" modal when a standard
Hunt blocks on an external-target receipt (was a dead-end); bounded-parallel
benchmark file ingestion; the deterministic mission-gate chip co-located with the
subjective SITREP pace narration (no more "behind schedule" next to a clean gate);
and click-through finding detail + evidence in the UI (was export-only).

Docs: README + INTEGRITY_LEDGER made re-derivable — honest 35/83 tool count, the
egress-containment default documented, and the Cybench number reconciled to the
single verify-claims-enforced 23/40 = 58% (dropped the stale/uncited 21 and 26).
README voice pass: killed the underselling `Successful Exploits: 0` disqualifier
(read as "never popped anything" — false, given CVE-Zero + the live disclosure
pipeline); swagger now rests on receipts, not vibes. Also corrected the operator
status — the downstream operators run the SAME real tool-backed ReAct loop as
recon (not "orchestration stubs"); the honest limit is that the coordinated swarm
is unproven (single-agent is the benchmarked path), not that they're scaffolding.

Gates: 292 tests, tsc + lint clean, verify-claims 20/20, arsenal:smoke 125/0,
disclosure-CLI self-test 11/11.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 09:38:23 -04:00

60 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Secret / credential redaction (server response + audit + SSE boundary). Pins the load-bearing scrub,
* including the 7th-pass fix: a `scheme://user:pass@host` login URL (the shape approval audit target/
* action strings take for a gated credential tool) must not leak its password over the REST endpoint or
* the SSE feed.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { redactString, redactSecrets } from '../redact.js';
describe('redactString — URL userinfo (basic-auth) scrub', () => {
it('strips the password from a scheme://user:pass@host login URL (all schemes)', () => {
expect(redactString('https://admin:hunter2@vpn.corp/login')).toBe('https://[redacted]@vpn.corp/login');
expect(redactString('ssh://root:toor@10.0.0.5')).toBe('ssh://[redacted]@10.0.0.5');
expect(redactString('ftp://svc:S3cr3t@files.internal/x')).toBe('ftp://[redacted]@files.internal/x');
});
it('covers a password that itself contains @ (redacts up to the LAST @ before the host)', () => {
expect(redactString('https://svcacct:S3cr3t-P@ss!23@intranet.corp/login'))
.toBe('https://[redacted]@intranet.corp/login');
});
it('leaves credential-free URLs and non-authority URIs untouched', () => {
expect(redactString('https://example.com/path?x=1')).toBe('https://example.com/path?x=1');
expect(redactString('visit https://host/a@b/c for docs')).toBe('visit https://host/a@b/c for docs'); // @ after a path segment, not userinfo
expect(redactString('mailto:alice@example.com')).toBe('mailto:alice@example.com'); // no ://, not userinfo
});
it('still redacts the pre-existing secret shapes (regression)', () => {
expect(redactString('key AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE here')).toContain('[redacted]');
expect(redactString('token=abc123def456ghi')).toBe('token=[redacted]');
expect(redactString('Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9')).toContain('Bearer [redacted]');
});
});
describe('redactSecrets — approval-audit record shape', () => {
it('scrubs a userinfo password in the audit target/action a gated credential tool would record', () => {
// mirrors what Arsenal.execute() records for password_spray({ url: 'https://user:pass@host/login' })
const record = {
tool: 'password_spray',
risk: 'credential',
target: 'https://admin:hunter2@vpn.corp/login',
action: 'password_spray (url=https://admin:hunter2@vpn.corp/login username=admin) → https://admin:hunter2@vpn.corp/login',
outcome: 'allowed-preapproved',
};
const out = redactSecrets(record) as typeof record;
expect(out.target).toBe('https://[redacted]@vpn.corp/login');
expect(out.action).not.toContain('hunter2');
expect(out.action).toContain('[redacted]');
});
it('redacts a key named like a secret and recurses through arrays/objects', () => {
const out = redactSecrets({ password: 'p', nested: [{ token: 't', url: 'https://u:pw@h/x' }] }) as {
password: string; nested: Array<{ token: string; url: string }>;
};
expect(out.password).toBe('[redacted]');
expect(out.nested[0].token).toBe('[redacted]');
expect(out.nested[0].url).toBe('https://[redacted]@h/x');
});
});