9020e5fc08721e94eaf150a9878f6286a8cb4f62
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Lyubomir Bozhinov
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9020e5fc08 |
feat(ingest): extract JS/TS arrow and function-expression definitions (#142)
* test(ingest): RED — JS/TS arrow and function-expression definitions are not extracted Pins issue #141 in both directions: every named-value function form must be extracted with its name, parameters and span, and the shapes carrying no name-to-function binding (IIFE, destructured, HOC-wrapped) must stay unmatched. Also covers the end-to-end consequence — an arrow-bound sink ranking attack_surface, and an arrow-bound handler becoming an entry point. Fails on main: the .js/.ts/.tsx def-queries bind declarations only. Refs #141 * feat(ingest): extract JS/TS arrow and function-expression definitions The .js/.ts/.tsx def-queries bound declarations only, so every definition bound to a value produced no CodeBlock and its sinks never reached classification or ranking. Adds the name-to-function-value shapes to all three queries: const f = (a) => {} / function (a) {} variable_declarator const f = a => ... un-parenthesized single param obj.f = ... / module.exports.handler assignment_expression onmessage = e => ... bare-identifier assignment { f: (a) => {} } pair class K { f = (a) => {} } field_definition / public_field_definition Query-only — no parser, pipeline or CodeBlock-shape change. nodeToCodeBlock already handles any @def/@name/@params triple and kindOf maps these to 'function'. Property-assigned and object-literal forms are named by the property, consistent with how method_definition is named: that is the name buildCallGraph and the entry-point heuristic match on. Not matched, by design: HOC-wrapped values (const h = withAuth(fn)) and anonymous callbacks (app.get('/x', (req,res) => ...)) have no name-to-function binding, and inventing one is worse than honest absence. whitebox.ts caveat block updated to match. Refs #141 * fix(ingest): capture #private class-field arrows; keep same-line block ids distinct Two defects found by adversarial review of the arrow-extraction change: - `class C { #handler = (x) => eval(x) }` yielded nothing: a private field's name is a `private_property_identifier`, not the `property_identifier` the class-field pattern required. A sink in a private handler is exactly as dangerous as one in a public handler, so it is captured (name keeps the `#`). - A block id is `path::name@line`, so two same-named definitions starting on the same line collide, and buildCallGraph keys on that id — the two blocks silently share one callers/callees entry even when only one carries a sink. Rare for declarations, routine once value-bound functions are extracted (minified bundles pack many `{ handler: … }` onto one line). The later block is now disambiguated by column; the first keeps the plain id, so no existing id changes and the Python path is untouched. Refs #141 |
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Lyubomir BozhinovandJoseph Magly
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151d3555c6 |
feat(ingest): multi-language white-box ingest (web-tree-sitter) (#75)
* chore(ingest): pin web-tree-sitter@0.25.10 + tree-sitter-wasms@0.1.13; add multilang-ingest design docs * feat(ingest): multi-language grammar registry (web-tree-sitter, 8 langs, fail-open); 100% cov * feat(ingest): language-aware param-name splitter (py/go/ts/java/c); 100% cov * feat(ingest): tree-sitter CodeBlock extractor with wall-clock parse budget + fail-open * feat(ingest): cross-lang sinks + multilang config + wire tree-sitter into ingestRepository (sync) * feat(ingest): repoint white-box production callers to multilang config + prod regression test * server-init-wiring: load multi-language grammars once at bootstrap initGrammars() runs after LLM init, before app.listen. Internally fail-open (never rejects): on failure the grammar registry stays empty and ingest falls back to the Python regex parser. * adversarial-tests: hostile-input hardening for untrusted target source Malformed per-language source, wrong-language content, binary/non-UTF8, empty, unicode identifiers, 20k-func large file (wall-clock budget), deeply nested input, and a symlink-loop crawl — all must fail-open, never throw or spin. Drives parseFileMultiLang + ingestRepository/crawl. * readme-status + docs: flip white-box status to multi-language ingest README source-code rows now state web-tree-sitter multi-language ingest (fail-open to Python regex). whitebox.ts scope caveat + no-source error message updated off the stale Python-only wording. * coverage-setup: enforce 100% coverage gate on the three new ingest files vitest.config.ts adds a coverage-only block (v8, perFile thresholds=100) scoped to ts-grammars.ts, param-split.ts, ts-parse.ts. Test discovery and env stay on defaults. Edited files gate on new-branch coverage via the regression suites; the server.ts initGrammars bootstrap line is the documented smoke-covered carve-out. * review: fix WASM heap leak, language-scoped fail-open, sink recall/precision Adversarial security + strict code review (two independent subagents) returned one blocking bug and several correctness findings; remediated: BLOCKING #1 — native WASM memory leak: web-tree-sitter Tree/Parser objects were never .delete()'d. Both reviewers reproduced a process-global wedge: after ~7 large parses the shared WASM heap exhausts, every subsequent parse aborts (caught by fail-open), and non-Python ingest silently returns [] forever. Fix: free the tree in a finally; delete the parser in resetParser. Regression test parses ~8MB through the real shared parser 12x. regex, which mis-parses brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks (wrong line spans, lost methods). Now non-.py fail-open returns [] (honest absence); the Python regex only ever runs on .py. Isolated ts-parse-fallback test. http(s).request, axios(config), C exec-family); negative lookbehind stops bare system(/popen(/fetch( from matching Python receivers (os.system etc. still matched, corpus rankings unchanged). Recall+precision tests added. operator sees non-Python degradation. (one-line call-graph edges, no decorators, C++ member methods). * review round 2: fix sink-regex regressions, real timeout test, deterministic leak guard Third review round (correctness + security re-attack + test-quality) against the round-1 fixes surfaced issues in the fixes themselves; remediated: - Sink-regex regressions I introduced: (1) my fetch lookbehind dropped window.fetch/this.fetch (top JS SSRF idiom) — reverted to \bfetch\(; (2) bare .Get/.Post/.Do flagged db.Get/cache.Get/queue.Do as SSRF — receiver-qualified to [Cc]lient. Recall+precision tests cover both; regex is ReDoS-free (timed). - Placebo leak test: the 12x function-dense loop did NOT wedge the parser on machines with heap headroom (proven: passed with tree.delete removed). Replaced with a deterministic vi.spyOn(Tree.prototype,'delete') assertion, verified RED without the fix. - Real (non-mocked) parse-timeout test: parseFileMultiLang gains an injectable budgetMs; a 0ms budget drives the real progressCallback cancellation to []. - runWhiteboxAnalysis swap now has coverage (spy on orchestrator.run) so the 2nd production caller can't silently revert to the Python-only config. - Un-vacuoused weak tests: unicode now asserts the extracted block; nested/ wrong-language wrapped in invariants() + timing bounds. - CI now runs npm run test:coverage (the 100% gate was defined but unenforced). - Security: documented maxFileBytes as the control bounding a single parse's peak WASM memory below the 2GB heap-abort ceiling. - Stale 'fail-open to Python regex' docs fixed (ts-parse, whitebox, server, adversarial); circular-import note added; temp-dir cleanup; honest coverage wording in spec + config. * docs(ingest): align fallback-contract text with the shipped language-scoped fail-open Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the design docs + one ts-grammars comment still described the pre-implementation 'fall back to the Python regex' model for non-Python files. The shipped contract is language-scoped: .py uses parseFile; any non-.py file with a missing/unsupported/failed grammar or a parse timeout returns [] (never the Python regex, which would mis-parse brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks). Updated every stale reference in multilang-ingest-spec.md, multilang-ingest-plan.md, and ts-grammars.ts so the docs match the security boundary. Docs/comment only — no code change. * fix(test): make the ReDoS wall-clock guard robust under coverage instrumentation Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the CI step this PR adds (npm run test:coverage = vitest run --coverage) runs the full suite under V8 coverage, and that overhead pushes the pathological-brace DoS timing guard in local-agent-tool-calling.test.ts:69 over its <300ms bound (320 < 300 fails on CI). Raise the bound to 1000ms — still 2x below the ~2100ms quadratic-ReDoS regression it guards against, so it fails hard if the regression returns, but no longer false-fails under coverage/slow CI. Chose the reviewer's option (a) (robust bound) over scoping test:coverage, so the gate stays a simple full-suite run and no test-file enumeration can rot. Verified: npm run test:coverage is green and the 3 new files stay at 100%. * fix(ingest): cover pointer-returning C functions --------- Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Joseph Magly
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be3eb7cb44 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into pr-70
# Conflicts: # src/config/index.ts # src/llm/index.ts # src/server.ts # src/setup.ts # src/types/index.ts |
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Joseph Magly
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df37e7c423 | Address upstream issues 60 and 62 | ||
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pliny
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5bec530a89 | Add files via upload |