fix: address Docker security and stability issues from PR review
Fixes all issues raised in PR #47 review: 1. Add .dockerignore to prevent: - Real .env secrets baked into image layers - Host node_modules (glibc) overwriting alpine (musl) → ABI mismatch - .git, reports/, evidence/ bloating the image 2. Fix compose host-binding: - Remove T3MP3ST_HOST=127.0.0.1 override (was breaking port forwarding) - Server now binds to 0.0.0.0 in-container (DOCKER=true from Dockerfile) - Host mapping stays 127.0.0.1:3333:3333 for security 3. Add critical security warning in DOCKER.md: - Explain exposure risk of 0.0.0.0 binding + disabled Host-header guard - Document safe vs unsafe deployment patterns - Warn against network_mode: host and -p 3333:3333 without 127.0.0.1 4. Update base image: - node:18-alpine → node:22-alpine (Node 18 EOL) - Pin by digest @sha256:16e22a550... (prevent floating tag drift) 5. Fix healthcheck in compose: - Was always returning success (process.exit(0)) - Now actually tests /api/health endpoint - Add start_period: 40s to align with Dockerfile 6. Fix port typos in DOCKER.md: - 3000 → 3333 in troubleshooting examples - Update all example snippets to node:22-alpine with digest
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@@ -110,14 +110,14 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml up
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The default `Dockerfile` is single-stage for simplicity. For production, consider a multi-stage build:
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```dockerfile
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FROM node:18-alpine AS builder
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FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2 AS builder
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WORKDIR /app
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COPY package*.json tsconfig.json ./
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RUN npm ci
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COPY . .
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RUN npm run build
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FROM node:18-alpine
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FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2
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WORKDIR /app
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COPY --from=builder /app/dist ./dist
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COPY --from=builder /app/node_modules ./node_modules
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@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ On Linux, match container UID/GID if needed:
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sudo chown -R $(id -u):$(id -g) reports evidence
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```
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### Port 3000 already in use
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### Port 3333 already in use
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Change the host port in `docker-compose.yml`:
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Change the host port in `docker-compose.yml` (keep the `127.0.0.1:` prefix for security):
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```yaml
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ports:
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- "8080:3000" # host:container
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- "127.0.0.1:8080:3333" # host:container
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```
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## Cleanup
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@@ -178,16 +178,31 @@ docker system prune -a --volumes
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## Security Notes
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**⚠️ CRITICAL: External Exposure Risk**
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The Docker setup binds the server to `0.0.0.0` inside the container to allow port forwarding. This disables the Host-header/DNS-rebinding guard in `server.ts`.
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**SAFE:** The default `docker-compose.yml` publishes the port as `127.0.0.1:3333:3333`, which restricts access to localhost only.
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**UNSAFE:** Running `docker run -p 3333:3333` (without the `127.0.0.1:` prefix) or `network_mode: host` exposes the **unauthenticated command-executing API** on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0), allowing anyone on your network (or the internet if port-forwarded) to execute arbitrary system commands.
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**Deployment Rules:**
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- ✅ Always bind to `127.0.0.1` on the host: `-p 127.0.0.1:3333:3333`
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- ✅ Use a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Coolify) with authentication for external access
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- ❌ Never use `network_mode: host` in untrusted networks
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- ❌ Never publish to `0.0.0.0` without authentication middleware
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**Additional Security:**
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- Container runs as root by default. For production, add a non-root user in the Dockerfile.
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- `.env` is mounted read-only in the compose file to prevent accidental modification.
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- Network mode is `bridge` by default. Change to `host` if scanning from the container's network context.
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- The `.env` file is excluded from the image via `.dockerignore` to prevent secret leakage.
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- Network mode is `bridge` by default (isolated from host network).
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## Integration with Tools
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External security tools (nuclei, ffuf, sqlmap) can run in separate containers or be installed in a custom Dockerfile:
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```dockerfile
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FROM node:18-alpine
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FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2
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RUN apk add --no-cache nmap nuclei ffuf
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# ... rest of Dockerfile
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```
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