docs(aiwg): add public input threat preflight

.aiwg/addons/t3mp3st-maintainer/templates/public-input-threat-assessment.md

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+---
+name: public-input-threat-assessment
+description: Threat assessment template for public user-authored GitHub content that may contain classic manipulation or agentic attacks.
+---
+
+# Public Input Threat Assessment
+
+Source: `<issue | PR | review | comment | commit | branch | log | screenshot | external link>`
+Reference: `<URL or #number>`
+Assessor: `<name/tool>`
+Date: `<YYYY-MM-DD>`
+
+## Public Content Reviewed
+
+| Content | User-Controlled Surface | Notes |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `<body/comment/log/etc>` | `<issue title/comment/patch/etc>` | `<notes>` |
+
+## Classic Manipulation / Turing Attack Checks
+
+| Check | Present | Evidence |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Urgency pressure or threat | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Flattery, social proof, or authority claim | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Request to skip tests, review, policy, or evidence | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Unsupported security or correctness claim | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Attempt to manipulate maintainer decision or priority | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+
+## Agentic Attack Checks
+
+| Check | Present | Evidence |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Prompt injection or hidden instruction | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Tool-use steering or command execution request | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Credential, token, environment, or secret exfiltration attempt | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Poisoned logs, tests, screenshots, filenames, or model output | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Objective redirection or instruction hierarchy override | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+| Suspicious external link or attachment | `<yes/no>` | `<evidence>` |
+
+## Security Framework Routing
+
+Required: `<yes/no>`
+
+Route used:
+
+- `aiwg discover "<phrase>"`
+- Selected artifact: `<skill/rule/flow or none>`
+
+Use security-engineering routing for auth, secrets, supply chain, CI, command
+execution, local model behavior, disclosure handling, or repository trust
+decisions.
+
+## Decision
+
+Risk: `<low | medium | high>`
+
+Allowed next action:
+
+- `<respond | audit PR | request changes | address-issues | defer | do not merge | escalate>`
+
+Required mitigations:
+
+- `<mitigation>`