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src/mcp-server.ts

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+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * T3MP3ST MCP Server v3.0
+ *
+ * Production-grade Model Context Protocol server exposing t3mp3st security
+ * tooling (security_recon — nmap/DNS reconnaissance).
+ *
+ */
+
+import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js';
+import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';
+import {
+  CallToolRequestSchema,
+  ListToolsRequestSchema,
+  Tool,
+} from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
+import { execFile } from 'child_process';
+import { promisify } from 'util';
+
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+
+// Strict target allowlist: hostnames, IPv4/IPv6, no shell metacharacters.
+// Anything outside this set is rejected before it can reach a subprocess.
+const TARGET_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+$/;
+
+// =============================================================================
+// COMPREHENSIVE PAYLOAD DATABASES
+// =============================================================================
+
+
+// =============================================================================
+// SECRET PATTERNS DATABASE (GRIFFIN)
+// =============================================================================
+
+
+// =============================================================================
+// PRIVILEGE ESCALATION DATABASE (CERBERUS)
+// =============================================================================
+
+
+// =============================================================================
+// WAF BYPASS TECHNIQUES (TYPHON)
+// =============================================================================
+
+
+// =============================================================================
+// TOOL DEFINITIONS
+// =============================================================================
+
+const MCP_TOOLS: Tool[] = [
+  {
+    name: 'security_recon',
+    description: `Quick reconnaissance using nmap and DNS tools.
+
+Performs network reconnaissance with configurable depth.
+
+Use when: Starting an engagement.
+Requires: Target hostname or IP.`,
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: {
+        target: { type: 'string', description: 'Target hostname or IP' },
+        scan_type: { type: 'string', enum: ['quick', 'standard', 'full', 'stealth'], description: 'Scan depth' }
+      },
+      required: ['target']
+    }
+  }
+];
+
+// =============================================================================
+// TOOL IMPLEMENTATIONS
+// =============================================================================
+
+const SAFE_COMMANDS = ['nmap', 'curl', 'dig', 'host', 'whois', 'nikto', 'gobuster', 'whatweb'];
+
+/**
+ * Run a whitelisted binary with an explicit argument array — NO shell.
+ *
+ * Because execFile does not spawn a shell and each arg is passed verbatim as a
+ * single argv entry, shell metacharacters in the (already regex-validated)
+ * target cannot be interpreted as command separators. The binary is checked
+ * against the allowlist, and every arg is validated for the absence of NUL.
+ */
+async function runTool(
+  binary: string,
+  args: string[],
+  timeout = 30000
+): Promise<{ success: boolean; output: string; error?: string }> {
+  if (!SAFE_COMMANDS.includes(binary)) {
+    return { success: false, output: '', error: `Command not allowed: ${binary}` };
+  }
+  // Defence-in-depth: reject NUL bytes which can truncate args at the syscall boundary.
+  if (args.some((a) => a.includes('\0'))) {
+    return { success: false, output: '', error: 'Invalid argument: NUL byte' };
+  }
+  try {
+    const { stdout, stderr } = await execFileAsync(binary, args, {
+      timeout,
+      maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 * 5,
+    });
+    return { success: true, output: stdout || stderr };
+  } catch (error: any) {
+    return { success: false, output: error.stdout || '', error: error.message };
+  }
+}
+
+
+
+async function handleToolCall(name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string> {
+  switch (name) {
+    // =========================================================================
+    // SECURITY RECON
+    // =========================================================================
+    case 'security_recon': {
+      const { target, scan_type = 'quick' } = args as any;
+
+      // Validate the target BEFORE it reaches any subprocess. Only hostnames /
+      // IPv4 / IPv6 literals are permitted; shell metacharacters (';', '|',
+      // '&', '$', spaces, backticks, ...) are rejected here. Combined with the
+      // no-shell execFile call below, "evil.com; id" is refused and, even if it
+      // slipped through, would be passed as a single inert argv entry.
+      if (typeof target !== 'string' || !TARGET_RE.test(target)) {
+        return JSON.stringify({
+          error: 'Invalid target: only hostnames, IPv4/IPv6 addresses are allowed ([A-Za-z0-9._:-]).',
+          target: typeof target === 'string' ? target : String(target)
+        }, null, 2);
+      }
+
+      const scanConfigs: Record<string, { portArgs: string[]; timing: string; scripts: boolean }> = {
+        quick: { portArgs: ['-F'], timing: '-T4', scripts: false },
+        standard: { portArgs: ['--top-ports', '1000'], timing: '-T3', scripts: true },
+        full: { portArgs: ['-p-'], timing: '-T2', scripts: true },
+        stealth: { portArgs: ['--top-ports', '100'], timing: '-T1', scripts: false }
+      };
+
+      const config = scanConfigs[scan_type] || scanConfigs.quick;
+
+      const nmapArgs = [
+        ...config.portArgs,
+        config.timing,
+        '-sV',
+        ...(config.scripts ? ['-sC'] : []),
+        '--open',
+        target
+      ];
+
+      const [dns, ports] = await Promise.all([
+        runTool('dig', ['+short', target, 'ANY']),
+        runTool('nmap', nmapArgs, 300000)
+      ]);
+
+      return JSON.stringify({
+        tool: 'RECON',
+        version: '3.0.0',
+        target,
+        scan_type,
+        results: {
+          dns: {
+            success: dns.success,
+            records: dns.output.trim().split('\n').filter(Boolean)
+          },
+          ports: {
+            success: ports.success,
+            output: ports.output,
+            error: ports.error
+          }
+        },
+        commands_executed: [
+          `dig +short ${target} ANY`,
+          `nmap ${nmapArgs.join(' ')}`
+        ],
+        next_steps: [
+          'Run vulnerability scan with nuclei',
+          'Enumerate web directories with gobuster',
+          'Check for common vulnerabilities'
+        ]
+      }, null, 2);
+    }
+
+    default:
+      return JSON.stringify({ error: `Unknown tool: ${name}` });
+  }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// MCP SERVER
+// =============================================================================
+
+const server = new Server(
+  { name: 't3mp3st-chef-specials', version: '3.0.0' },
+  { capabilities: { tools: {} } }
+);
+
+server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => ({
+  tools: MCP_TOOLS,
+}));
+
+server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request: any) => {
+  const { name, arguments: args } = request.params;
+  try {
+    const result = await handleToolCall(name, args || {});
+    return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: result }] };
+  } catch (error: any) {
+    return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify({ error: error.message }) }], isError: true };
+  }
+});
+
+async function main() {
+  const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
+  await server.connect(transport);
+  console.error('[T3MP3ST MCP] server running — security_recon (nmap/DNS recon)');
+}
+
+main().catch(console.error);