T3MP3ST public launch build
This commit is contained in:
t3mp3st contributors committed
1 parent
972247b881
commit
184c7d4e59
1589 files changed
+57150
-506
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-05-29T15:42:45Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 1, "lenient": 1, "strict_pct": 100, "lenient_pct": 100, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-hx53-77qj-8663", "cve": "CVE-2026-7474", "repo": "hashicorp/nomad", "strict": true, "lenient": true, "top": {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Path traversal in host-volume ID enables arbitrary directory deletion (RemoveAll) and creation on the client host", "file": "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go", "line": 210, "cwe": "CWE-22"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-05T15:13:35Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 0, "lenient": 0, "strict_pct": 0, "lenient_pct": 0, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-36hh-x5p5-jgc8", "cve": "CVE-2026-44974", "repo": "hapijs/content", "strict": false, "lenient": false, "top": {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "ReDoS (quadratic backtracking) in Content-Disposition parameter parsing", "file": "lib/index.js", "line": 88, "cwe": "CWE-1333"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-05T15:16:44Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 0, "lenient": 1, "strict_pct": 0, "lenient_pct": 100, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc", "cve": "CVE-2026-42864", "repo": "ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident", "strict": false, "lenient": true, "top": {"fileMatch": false, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": true, "hit": false, "title": "Unauthenticated SSRF via attacker-controlled attachment URLs in Jira bot endpoint", "file": "src/firefighter/raid/client.py", "line": 150, "cwe": "CWE-918"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-05T15:18:59Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 1, "lenient": 1, "strict_pct": 100, "lenient_pct": 100, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-hm2w-vr2p-hq7w", "cve": null, "repo": "theopolis/uefi-firmware-parser", "strict": true, "lenient": true, "top": {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Out-of-bounds write in ReadCLen: attacker-controlled run-length fills mCLen[] past NC with no bounds check", "file": "uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c", "line": 525, "cwe": "CWE-787"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-05T15:20:40Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 1, "lenient": 1, "strict_pct": 100, "lenient_pct": 100, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65", "cve": "CVE-2026-44705", "repo": "raszi/node-tmp", "strict": true, "lenient": true, "top": {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Path traversal / arbitrary file & directory write outside tmpdir via prefix-only startsWith check", "file": "lib/tmp.js", "line": 581, "cwe": "CWE-22"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-05T15:22:22Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 1, "lenient": 1, "strict_pct": 100, "lenient_pct": 100, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-rg3m-cfq7-g6h6", "cve": "CVE-2026-43947", "repo": "frangoteam/FUXA", "strict": true, "lenient": true, "top": {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Node-RED admin auth bypass via unanchored URL substring match (\"/dashboard\") leading to RCE", "file": "server/integrations/node-red/index.js", "line": 160, "cwe": "CWE-287"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-05T15:26:03Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 0, "lenient": 0, "strict_pct": 0, "lenient_pct": 0, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-vv9j-gjw2-j8wp", "cve": "CVE-2026-42089", "repo": "yeoman/environment", "strict": false, "lenient": false}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"timestamp": "2026-06-06T06:27:11Z", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "total": 1, "strict": 0, "lenient": 0, "strict_pct": 0, "lenient_pct": 0, "results": [{"id": "GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532", "cve": "CVE-2026-46717", "repo": "nezhahq/nezha", "strict": false, "lenient": false, "top": {"fileMatch": false, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "Nil-pointer dereference / division-by-zero in alert cycle-transfer rule evaluation (DoS)", "file": "model/rule.go", "line": 187, "cwe": "CWE-476"}}]}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"test": "fallback-smoke-hunt", "timestamp": "2026-06-06T13:40:37Z", "via": "real LLMBackbone.chat() (dist/llm/index.js)", "model": "claude-opus-4-8", "fault_injection": ["rung0 (primary): anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 + DEAD KEY \u2192 expect auth", "rung1 : openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 + real key \u2192 expect model/bad_request", "rung2 : anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 + real key \u2192 expect SUCCESS"], "sample": "GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65", "cve": "CVE-2026-44705", "cwes": ["CWE-22"], "ladder": {"fallback_hops": 21, "by_reason": {"auth": 7, "bad_request": 7, "recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request": 7}, "refusals": 0, "total_exhaustions": 0, "recovered": true}, "hunt": {"verdict": "STRICT", "strict": true, "lenient": true, "duration_sec": 78.5, "top_finding": {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Temp directory containment bypass via naive startsWith prefix check (path traversal / arbitrary file write)", "file": "lib/tmp.js", "line": 581, "cwe": "CWE-22"}, "n_findings": 1}, "ladder_log": [" \u21aa [13:39:23] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:39:25] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:27] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:27] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:39:28] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:31] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:33] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:39:35] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:39] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:40] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:39:43] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:49] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request", " \u21aa [13:39:49] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:39:52] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:40:09] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request", " \u21aa [13:40:10] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:40:13] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:40:22] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request", " \u21aa [13:40:23] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 reason=auth", " \u21aa [13:40:23] fallback openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=bad_request", " \u21aa [13:40:37] fallback anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 \u2192 anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 reason=recovered_after:anthropic/claude-opus-4.8:auth>openrouter/smoke-nonexistent-model-zzz-9000:bad_request"], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-36hh-x5p5-jgc8", "cve": "CVE-2026-44974", "repo": "hapijs/content", "cwes": ["CWE-436"], "vuln_files": ["lib/index.js"], "duration_sec": 143.2, "error": null, "strict": false, "lenient": false, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "ReDoS (quadratic backtracking) in Content-Disposition parameter parsing", "file": "lib/index.js", "line": 88, "cwe": "CWE-1333"}], "n_findings": 1, "findings": [{"title": "ReDoS (quadratic backtracking) in Content-Disposition parameter parsing", "file": "lib/index.js", "line": 88, "cwe": "CWE-1333", "vuln_class": "dos", "severity": "high", "description": "exports.disposition() validates the header against contentDispositionRegex (line 96), extracts the parameter substring (match[1]), and then runs the global regex internals.contentDispositionParamRegex (line 88) over it via String.replace at line 107. That regex starts with the greedy group ([^\\=\\*\\s]+) which must then be followed by \\s*\\=. When attacker input contains a long run of non-'=', non-'*', non-whitespace characters that never contains an '=' (e.g. 'form-data; aaaaa...'), the greedy group matches the whole run, fails to find '=', and because the regex is global, String.replace re-attempts the match starting at every subsequent position. Each attempt does O(n) work, yielding O(n^2) total time with no upstream length limit in this module. Measured: 20k chars = 0.3s, 40k = 1.3s, 80k = 5.3s, 100k = 8.2s, 200k = 32s. This synchronously blocks the single-threaded Node.js event loop. The header value is fully attacker-controlled and reaches the sink without any length/complexity sanitizer (the only pre-checks are __proto__ guards and the form-data prefix match, neither of which limits input size).", "poc": "Send a multipart request whose part Content-Disposition header (or call Content.disposition() directly) is: 'form-data; ' followed by ~100000 'a' characters with no '=' sign. Example: Content.disposition('form-data; ' + 'a'.repeat(100000)) blocks the event loop for ~8 seconds; scaling the length increases the stall quadratically, enabling a single small-ish request to cause sustained denial of service.", "confidence": 0.9}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-3jmg-p96m-m328", "cve": "CVE-2026-46410", "repo": "gtsteffaniak/filebrowser", "cwes": ["CWE-200"], "vuln_files": ["backend/common/settings/settings.go"], "duration_sec": 81.8, "error": null, "strict": false, "lenient": false, "findings_scored": [], "n_findings": 0, "findings": [], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc", "cve": "CVE-2026-42864", "repo": "ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident", "cwes": ["CWE-306", "CWE-918"], "vuln_files": ["src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py", "src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py"], "duration_sec": 188.9, "error": null, "strict": false, "lenient": true, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": false, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": true, "hit": false, "title": "Unauthenticated SSRF via attacker-controlled attachment URLs in Jira bot endpoint", "file": "src/firefighter/raid/client.py", "line": 150, "cwe": "CWE-918"}, {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Unauthenticated Jira webhook handlers allow forged incident status/priority changes", "file": "src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py", "line": 97, "cwe": "CWE-306"}], "n_findings": 2, "findings": [{"title": "Unauthenticated SSRF via attacker-controlled attachment URLs in Jira bot endpoint", "file": "src/firefighter/raid/client.py", "line": 150, "cwe": "CWE-918", "vuln_class": "ssrf", "severity": "high", "description": "The `CreateJiraBotView` API endpoint (urls.py -> views/__init__.py) is exposed with `permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]`, so it is reachable by an unauthenticated attacker. Its serializer `LandbotIssueRequestSerializer` accepts an `attachments` field as a plain `CharField` with no URL/scheme/host validation. In `LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.create()` (serializers.py ~lines 247-257) the attachments string is split into a list and passed directly to `jira_client.add_attachments_to_issue(issue_id, attachments)`. The sink `RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue` (client.py:150) iterates the attacker-supplied list and performs `http_client.get(url)` for each entry with no allow-list, scheme check, or private-IP/metadata-host filtering. An attacker can therefore force the server to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP(S) GET requests to internal-only services or the cloud metadata endpoint, enabling internal port scanning and (on GCP/AWS) retrieval of instance metadata/credentials. The retrieved content is uploaded as a Jira attachment, providing an exfiltration channel for the fetched body.", "poc": "POST /api/<version>/raid/jira_bot HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"summary\": \"x\",\n \"description\": \"x\",\n \"seller_contract_id\": \"1\",\n \"zoho\": \"\",\n \"platform\": \"FR\",\n \"reporter_email\": \"attacker@example.com\",\n \"incident_category\": \"\",\n \"suggested_team_routing\": \"SBI\",\n \"priority\": 4,\n \"business_impact\": \"Low\",\n \"attachments\": \"http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token\"\n}\n\nThe server (issue creation succeeds, then) performs http_client.get('http://169.254.169.254/...') from inside the trusted network and attaches the response body (e.g., the GCP service-account token) to the created Jira issue.", "confidence": 0.85}, {"title": "Unauthenticated Jira webhook handlers allow forged incident status/priority changes", "file": "src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py", "line": 97, "cwe": "CWE-306", "vuln_class": "auth-bypass", "severity": "medium", "description": "`JiraUpdateAlertView` and `JiraCommentAlertView` set `authentication_classes = []` and `permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]` (the maintainers left an `XXX: Work on webhook token` note). An attacker can POST a forged Jira `jira:issue_updated` webhook referencing any JiraTicket key. Through `JiraWebhookUpdateSerializer._handle_status_update`/`_handle_priority_update` this lets an unauthenticated remote attacker drive a real incident to CLOSED status or change its priority (calling `incident.create_incident_update`), and spam Slack channels with attacker-controlled author/comment text. Exploitation requires knowing/guessing a JiraTicket key, but keys are low-entropy sequential (PROJECT-NNN).", "poc": "POST /api/<version>/raid/jira_update with body {\"webhookEvent\":\"jira:issue_updated\",\"user\":{\"displayName\":\"x\"},\"issue\":{\"id\":1,\"key\":\"SBI-123\"},\"changelog\":{\"items\":[{\"field\":\"status\",\"fromString\":\"Reporter validation\",\"toString\":\"Closed\"}]}}", "confidence": 0.55}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-hm2w-vr2p-hq7w", "cve": null, "repo": "theopolis/uefi-firmware-parser", "cwes": ["CWE-787"], "vuln_files": ["uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c"], "duration_sec": 135, "error": null, "strict": true, "lenient": true, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Out-of-bounds write in ReadCLen: attacker-controlled run-length fills mCLen[] past NC with no bounds check", "file": "uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c", "line": 525, "cwe": "CWE-787"}, {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": false, "hit": true, "title": "GetInfo reports DstSize purely from attacker-controlled header (size mismatch / undersized output buffer risk)", "file": "uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c", "line": 717, "cwe": "CWE-130"}], "n_findings": 2, "findings": [{"title": "Out-of-bounds write in ReadCLen: attacker-controlled run-length fills mCLen[] past NC with no bounds check", "file": "uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c", "line": 525, "cwe": "CWE-787", "vuln_class": "out-of-bounds-write", "severity": "critical", "description": "In ReadCLen(), the symbol count `Number` is read from 9 attacker-controlled bits (GetBits(Sd, CBIT), CBIT=9 => up to 511) and the outer loop runs `while (Index < Number)`. Inside, when the decoded CharC<=2 it performs a run-length zero-fill: for CharC==2 the run length is `GetBits(Sd, CBIT) + 20` (up to 531) and the inner loop `while ((INT16)CharC >= 0) Sd->mCLen[Index++] = 0;` advances Index by up to ~531 in a single outer iteration. There is NO `Index >= NC` bound check anywhere in ReadCLen (NC=510, mCLen is UINT8 mCLen[510]). Because the outer bound is only re-checked between iterations and Index can jump by hundreds at a time, Index can be driven far beyond NC, writing zero bytes well past mCLen[] into the adjacent struct members (mPTLen, mCTable, mPTTable) and past the end of the SCRATCH_DATA scratch allocation. All inputs flow unvalidated from the compressed source buffer (Decompress -> Decode -> DecodeC -> ReadCLen) which is attacker-controlled firmware. Note the maintainer added a guard in MakeTable (Index>=TableSize) and a DataIdx check in Decode, but the analogous Index>=NC guard required in ReadCLen is missing (it exists in upstream/fixed EDK2). The line 531 single-byte write path is also unguarded.", "poc": "Provide a crafted EFI/Tiano compressed blob to EfiDecompress()/TianoDecompress(): 8-byte header CompSize/OrigSize consistent with SrcSize, then a block whose ReadPTLen tables decode the Char&Len set such that ReadCLen reads Number (9 bits) = large value and repeatedly decodes the code that maps to CharC==2, supplying GetBits(9)=large run lengths so the inner `Sd->mCLen[Index++] = 0;` loop advances Index past 510 and keeps overrunning across many outer iterations, corrupting memory beyond mCLen[510] within/after the SCRATCH_DATA buffer.", "confidence": 0.9}, {"title": "GetInfo reports DstSize purely from attacker-controlled header (size mismatch / undersized output buffer risk)", "file": "uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c", "line": 717, "cwe": "CWE-130", "vuln_class": "info-disclosure", "severity": "low", "description": "GetInfo() derives *DstSize entirely from the 4-byte OrigSize field in the attacker-controlled source header with no sanity bound vs SrcSize. Decompress() later enforces DstSize==OrigSize, so a mismatch is rejected, but a caller that allocates based on this value and then runs the decoder is exposed to the ReadCLen/Decode write primitives above. Secondary to the primary finding.", "poc": "Header bytes 4..7 set to an arbitrary 32-bit OrigSize control the size returned to the caller for buffer allocation.", "confidence": 0.25}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-hx53-77qj-8663", "cve": "CVE-2026-7474", "repo": "hashicorp/nomad", "cwes": ["CWE-22"], "vuln_files": ["client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go", "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin_test.go", "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volumes_test.go"], "duration_sec": 95.4, "error": null, "strict": true, "lenient": true, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Path traversal in host-volume ID enables arbitrary directory deletion (RemoveAll) and creation on the client host", "file": "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go", "line": 210, "cwe": "CWE-22"}, {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Path traversal in PluginID selects and executes an arbitrary on-disk executable", "file": "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go", "line": 229, "cwe": "CWE-22"}], "n_findings": 2, "findings": [{"title": "Path traversal in host-volume ID enables arbitrary directory deletion (RemoveAll) and creation on the client host", "file": "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go", "line": 210, "cwe": "CWE-22", "vuln_class": "path-traversal", "severity": "high", "description": "The built-in 'mkdir' host-volume plugin builds the on-disk target path with path := filepath.Join(p.VolumesDir, req.ID) (lines 105 and 203) and then performs destructive filesystem operations: os.MkdirAll/os.Chmod/os.Chown in Create (lines 133-160) and os.RemoveAll(path) in Delete (line 210). req.ID originates from the ClientHostVolumeDeleteRequest/ClientHostVolumeCreateRequest forwarded verbatim to the client RPC handler (HostVolume.Create/Delete -> HostVolumeManager.Create/Delete -> getPlugin -> HostVolumePluginMkdir). Nowhere in client/hostvolumemanager is req.ID validated to reject '..' or absolute components, and filepath.Join cleans the path so a traversal like '../../../../etc' escapes VolumesDir. Because the Nomad client agent typically runs as root, a request with a traversing ID causes os.RemoveAll to recursively delete an arbitrary host directory (e.g. the volumes dir's parents, /etc, plugin dirs), and Create can chown/chmod arbitrary existing directories. This is a destructive, attacker-influenced filesystem primitive reachable from the dynamic-host-volume RPC path with no sanitizer between source and sink.", "poc": "Issue a dynamic host volume delete (or create) whose volume ID contains traversal, e.g. ClientHostVolumeDeleteRequest{PluginID:\"mkdir\", ID:\"../../../../../../etc/cron.d\", NodeID:<target>} -> client computes path=filepath.Join(VolumesDir, \"../../../../../../etc/cron.d\") and runs os.RemoveAll on it, deleting /etc/cron.d on the host. With Create, ID=\"../../../../some/existing/dir\" plus parameters {mode:777,uid:0} chmods/chowns that dir.", "confidence": 0.7}, {"title": "Path traversal in PluginID selects and executes an arbitrary on-disk executable", "file": "client/hostvolumemanager/host_volume_plugin.go", "line": 229, "cwe": "CWE-22", "vuln_class": "rce", "severity": "high", "description": "getPlugin(req.PluginID) (host_volumes.go) falls through to NewHostVolumePluginExternal(log, hvm.pluginDir, id, ...) where id == req.PluginID. The executable path is built as executable := filepath.Join(pluginDir, filename) (line 229) with no rejection of '..' or absolute path components. filepath.Join cleans the path, so a PluginID like '../../../../bin/sh' resolves to an executable outside the configured plugin directory. The only guard is os.Stat + helper.IsExecutable, so any executable file on the host can be selected and then invoked via exec.CommandContext in runPlugin/Fingerprint/Create/Delete with attacker-controlled environment variables (DHV_PARAMETERS, DHV_VOLUME_ID, etc.). The Nomad client runs this as root, allowing execution of arbitrary host binaries with attacker-influenced environment as part of volume create/delete/fingerprint.", "poc": "Send a dynamic host volume create/delete with PluginID=\"../../../../../../usr/bin/<target-binary>\" so filepath.Join(pluginDir, PluginID) resolves to an arbitrary executable, which Nomad then runs as the client process user (typically root) with attacker-controlled DHV_* env vars.", "confidence": 0.55}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-m6xr-fvfg-5g64", "cve": "CVE-2026-46378", "repo": "TomWright/dasel", "cwes": ["CWE-835"], "vuln_files": ["selector/lexer/tokenize.go", "selector/lexer/tokenize_test.go"], "duration_sec": 77.8, "error": null, "strict": false, "lenient": true, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "Panic (index out of range) when selector ends with whitespace", "file": "selector/lexer/tokenize.go", "line": 60, "cwe": "CWE-125"}, {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Infinite loop on unterminated regex literal r/...", "file": "selector/lexer/tokenize.go", "line": 280, "cwe": "CWE-835"}], "n_findings": 2, "findings": [{"title": "Panic (index out of range) when selector ends with whitespace", "file": "selector/lexer/tokenize.go", "line": 60, "cwe": "CWE-125", "vuln_class": "dos", "severity": "high", "description": "In parseCurRune(), after the leading whitespace-skip loop (line 55) advances p.i, the code unconditionally dereferences p.src[p.i] at line 60 (the '//' comment check) and again at line 74 (the main switch) without re-checking p.i < p.srcLen. Next() guards only the entry condition p.i >= len(p.src), so any selector that contains trailing whitespace (or whose remaining suffix is only whitespace after a comment) will cause p.i to reach p.srcLen inside parseCurRune, and the next p.src[p.i] access panics with 'runtime error: index out of range'. Anywhere dasel exposes selector parsing to untrusted input (CLI args, library users, or any service embedding dasel's selector lexer), a one-byte attacker-controlled string such as a single space crashes the process. Tokenize() is the documented entrypoint, so reachability is trivial.", "poc": "lexer.NewTokenizer(\" \").Tokenize() // panics: runtime error: index out of range [1] with length 1. Also reproducible with any selector ending in whitespace, e.g. \"foo \" or \"a.b \".", "confidence": 0.95}, {"title": "Infinite loop on unterminated regex literal r/...", "file": "selector/lexer/tokenize.go", "line": 280, "cwe": "CWE-835", "vuln_class": "dos", "severity": "high", "description": "matchRegexPattern (line 274) recognises an 'r/' prefix and then scans for the closing '/': `for !p.peekRuneEqual(pos, '/') { pos++ }`. peekRuneEqual returns false whenever pos >= p.srcLen, so once pos walks past the end of the input without finding a '/', the condition stays true forever and pos is incremented without bound. There is no srcLen guard inside the loop and no error path for an unterminated regex. Any selector containing `r/` without a matching closing slash causes Tokenize() to hang, consuming a CPU core indefinitely (and eventually causing an integer overflow / huge allocation if it ever exited at p.src[start+2:pos-1]).", "poc": "lexer.NewTokenizer(\"r/abc\").Tokenize() // hangs forever inside matchRegexPattern's scan loop.", "confidence": 0.95}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65", "cve": "CVE-2026-44705", "repo": "raszi/node-tmp", "cwes": ["CWE-22"], "vuln_files": ["lib/tmp.js"], "duration_sec": 100.3, "error": null, "strict": true, "lenient": true, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Path traversal / arbitrary file & directory write outside tmpdir via prefix-only startsWith check", "file": "lib/tmp.js", "line": 581, "cwe": "CWE-22"}], "n_findings": 1, "findings": [{"title": "Path traversal / arbitrary file & directory write outside tmpdir via prefix-only startsWith check", "file": "lib/tmp.js", "line": 581, "cwe": "CWE-22", "vuln_class": "path-traversal", "severity": "high", "description": "The containment check in _getRelativePath (line 581) and its sync twin _getRelativePathSync (line 600) validates that a user-supplied 'dir', 'template' or 'name' option stays inside tmpDir using `resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir)`. This is a prefix match without a trailing path separator. An attacker-controlled `dir` (e.g. '../<tmpDirBasename>EVIL/sub') resolves (via path.join(tmpDir, name) + fs.realpath in _resolvePath/_resolvePathSync) to a SIBLING directory whose absolute path begins with the tmpDir string but is NOT actually inside tmpDir. For tmpDir '/tmp/realtmp', resolvedPath '/tmp/realtmpEVIL/pwned' satisfies startsWith(tmpDir) === true, so the check passes. The (escaped) relative path is then stored as options.dir and used by _generateTmpName -> path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), causing fs.open (file/fileSync), fs.mkdir (dir/dirSync), and especially the recursive rimraf/FN_RIMRAF_SYNC removal used with unsafeCleanup to operate on a location OUTSIDE the temp directory the consumer intended to confine operations to. Verified empirically: resolvedPath '/tmp/realtmpEVIL/pwned'.startsWith('/tmp/realtmp') === true.", "poc": "const tmp = require('tmp'); // assume os.tmpdir() realpaths to '/private/tmp' or any dir; create sibling sharing prefix\n// tmpDir basename is e.g. 'mytmp' -> attacker provides a dir option escaping to a prefix-sharing sibling\ntmp.dirSync({ tmpdir: '/tmp/mytmpEVIL/inner', unsafeCleanup: true });\n// The startsWith('/tmp/tmp/inner',\n// so node-tmp creates (and on cleanup recursively rm -rf's) a directory OUTSIDE the intended tmpDir.\n// Equivalent file write: tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir:'/t/mytmp', name:undefined, dir:'../mytmpEVIL/x', template:'fileXXXXXX' });", "confidence": 0.85}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-rg3m-cfq7-g6h6", "cve": "CVE-2026-43947", "repo": "frangoteam/FUXA", "cwes": ["CWE-863"], "vuln_files": ["server/api/command/index.js", "server/integrations/node-red/index.js"], "duration_sec": 102.9, "error": null, "strict": true, "lenient": true, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": true, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Node-RED admin auth bypass via unanchored URL substring match (\"/dashboard\") leading to RCE", "file": "server/integrations/node-red/index.js", "line": 160, "cwe": "CWE-287"}, {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": true, "hit": true, "title": "Node-RED SPA catch-all serves index from settings.httpStatic without sanitization (low)", "file": "server/integrations/node-red/index.js", "line": 280, "cwe": "CWE-285"}], "n_findings": 2, "findings": [{"title": "Node-RED admin auth bypass via unanchored URL substring match (\"/dashboard\") leading to RCE", "file": "server/integrations/node-red/index.js", "line": 160, "cwe": "CWE-287", "vuln_class": "auth-bypass", "severity": "critical", "description": "The allowDashboard middleware (mounted on app.use('/nodered', allowDashboard, RED.httpAdmin)) is the only authentication gate for the Node-RED admin/editor API; no adminAuth is configured in redSettings. At line 157 it builds url = req.originalUrl, which in Express includes the mount path AND the raw query string. Line 160 then grants public access with `if (url.includes('/dashboard') || url.includes('/socket.io')) return next();`. Because this is an unanchored substring test on the full URL+query, any request to a protected admin route that merely contains the substring '/dashboard' (or 'dashboard') anywhere\u2014including inside the query string\u2014short-circuits before the JWT / x-api-key validation, even when settings.secureEnabled is true. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore reach the full Node-RED admin REST API. Via POST /nodered/flows they can deploy a flow containing a Function node, which (with the broad functionGlobalContext exposing fs, fsSync, os, child_process when enabled, plus the FUXA runtime helpers like runScript/setTag) yields arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution on the FUXA host.", "poc": "1) Read flows unauthenticated: GET /nodered/flows?x=/dashboard HTTP/1.1 (url.includes('/dashboard') is true -> next() without token). 2) Deploy malicious flow unauthenticated: POST /nodered/flows?x=/dashboard with header 'Content-Type: application/json' and a flow array containing an inject node wired to a function node whose body uses the exposed global context, e.g. node 'func': {\"func\":\"const cp=global.get('child_process')||require('child_process'); cp.exec('id > /tmp/pwned'); return msg;\"} (or use fsSync to write a webshell). The deploy is accepted because authentication was bypassed, resulting in RCE.", "confidence": 0.9}, {"title": "Node-RED SPA catch-all serves index from settings.httpStatic without sanitization (low)", "file": "server/integrations/node-red/index.js", "line": 280, "cwe": "CWE-285", "vuln_class": "info-disclosure", "severity": "low", "description": "The same substring-based reasoning applies to the catch-all and exclusion logic using req.path.startsWith/includes; while less severe, the auth model around /nodered relies on fragile string matching. Secondary to the primary auth-bypass finding.", "poc": "GET /nodered/something?dashboard also bypasses the gate due to the same includes() check.", "confidence": 0.4}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-vv9j-gjw2-j8wp", "cve": "CVE-2026-42089", "repo": "yeoman/environment", "cwes": ["CWE-829"], "vuln_files": ["src/environment-full.ts"], "duration_sec": 220.2, "error": null, "strict": false, "lenient": false, "findings_scored": [], "n_findings": 0, "findings": [], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"id": "GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532", "cve": "CVE-2026-46717", "repo": "nezhahq/nezha", "cwes": ["CWE-863", "CWE-918"], "vuln_files": ["model/notification.go", "model/notification_test.go"], "duration_sec": 104, "error": null, "strict": false, "lenient": false, "findings_scored": [{"fileMatch": false, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "Nil-pointer dereference / division-by-zero in alert cycle-transfer rule evaluation (DoS)", "file": "model/rule.go", "line": 187, "cwe": "CWE-476"}, {"fileMatch": false, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "Panic on slices.Max over empty slice for gpu_max / temperature_max rules (DoS)", "file": "model/rule.go", "line": 70, "cwe": "CWE-248"}, {"fileMatch": true, "lineProx": false, "cweMatch": false, "hit": false, "title": "Unescaped notification template substitution enables JSON/body injection in outbound notifications", "file": "model/notification.go", "line": 79, "cwe": "CWE-116"}], "n_findings": 3, "findings": [{"title": "Nil-pointer dereference / division-by-zero in alert cycle-transfer rule evaluation (DoS)", "file": "model/rule.go", "line": 187, "cwe": "CWE-476", "vuln_class": "dos", "severity": "high", "description": "Rule.CycleStart is a *time.Time tagged validate:\"optional\" and Rule.CycleInterval is an unvalidated uint64; both are populated directly from the alert-rule API form (AlertRuleForm.Rules -> Rule) and persisted/loaded via AlertRule.RulesRaw JSON (un)marshaling with no validation. In Rule.Snapshot, for any rule whose Type ends in '_cycle' (IsTransferDurationRule()==true), the block at lines 141-163 ALWAYS calls u.GetTransferDurationStart() and u.GetTransferDurationEnd() at lines 161-162 \u2014 independently of the 'if u.CycleInterval != 0' guards used earlier (lines 97/104/111). GetTransferDurationStart() begins with 'startTime := *u.CycleStart' (line 187): if cycle_start was omitted in the rule JSON, this dereferences a nil *time.Time and panics. The same functions also compute 'interval := 3600 * int64(u.CycleInterval)' and divide by it in the default/hour branch (lines 217/257); with cycle_interval==0 this is an integer division by zero panic. Either panic aborts the periodic alert-evaluation goroutine that runs Snapshot for every monitored server, taking down monitoring/alerting (availability) for the whole dashboard.", "poc": "As an authenticated user create/save an alert rule with a rule object: {\"rules\":[{\"type\":\"transfer_in_cycle\",\"max\":1}]} (no cycle_start, cycle_interval=0, cycle_unit unset). On the next alert tick the server evaluates Rule.Snapshot -> GetTransferDurationStart() -> '*u.CycleStart' nil dereference panic (and/or 3600*0 division-by-zero in the default unit branch), crashing the alerting loop.", "confidence": 0.78}, {"title": "Panic on slices.Max over empty slice for gpu_max / temperature_max rules (DoS)", "file": "model/rule.go", "line": 70, "cwe": "CWE-248", "vuln_class": "dos", "severity": "medium", "description": "In Rule.Snapshot, the 'gpu_max' branch calls slices.Max(server.State.GPU) (line 70) and the 'temperature_max' branch calls slices.Max(temp) (line 136). Go's slices.Max panics when given a zero-length slice. server.State.GPU and Temperatures originate from agent-reported HostState (PB2State) and are not guaranteed non-empty; an agent reporting no GPU/temperature data combined with an admin-configured 'gpu_max'/'temperature_max' alert rule causes slices.Max to panic and crash the alert-evaluation goroutine.", "poc": "Configure an alert rule {\"rules\":[{\"type\":\"gpu_max\",\"max\":1}]} for a server whose agent reports no GPU data (empty GPU slice). On evaluation, slices.Max([]) panics.", "confidence": 0.5}, {"title": "Unescaped notification template substitution enables JSON/body injection in outbound notifications", "file": "model/notification.go", "line": 79, "cwe": "CWE-116", "vuln_class": "info-disclosure", "severity": "low", "description": "reqBody()'s Form branch (line 79) calls replaceParamsInString with a nil mod function, so attacker-influenced server fields (e.g. Server.Name, public note, agent-reported metrics) are substituted into form/body parameters without escaping. Combined with attacker-controlled notification URL/headers (setRequestHeader sets arbitrary headers, Send may skip TLS verification), this allows content injection into outbound requests, though it requires notification configuration privileges.", "poc": "Set a server name containing form-breaking characters and a Form-type notification whose body references #SERVER.NAME#; the value is inserted unescaped into the urlencoded body.", "confidence": 0.2}], "transcript": ""}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user