T3MP3ST public launch build

bench/cve-hunt/samples/CVE-2022-22965/ground-truth.yaml

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+cve: CVE-2022-22965
+alias: Spring4Shell — DataBinder classLoader traversal
+cwe_primary: CWE-915
+cwe_acceptable: [CWE-915, CWE-94, CWE-470, CWE-913, CWE-20, CWE-913, CWE-1336]
+target_file: source.java
+vuln_lines: [27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]
+severity: critical
+vuln_class: improper_property_binding
+exploit_pattern_regex: 'class\.module\.classLoader|classLoader\.resources|AccessLogValve|\.classLoader\.'
+must_mention_any:
+  - classloader
+  - class loader
+  - introspect
+  - nested property
+  - getClass
+  - allowlist
+  - filter
+  - tomcat
+  - accesslogvalve
+  - jsp
+points: 30
+notes: |
+  Vulnerability: setNestedProperty traverses ANY dotted path through bean
+  introspection without filtering forbidden navigations like "class.module.
+  classLoader" — letting attacker reach Tomcat AccessLogValve and write
+  a JSP webshell to the server filesystem.
+  Hunter MUST identify:
+    1. Untrusted parameter name flows into bean traversal.
+    2. No allowlist/denylist on traversal targets (class/classLoader/module).
+    3. The result is arbitrary property write → RCE primitive.

bench/cve-hunt/samples/CVE-2022-22965/source.java

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+// Spring DataBinder + JDK9+ property navigation — pre-CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell).
+// PropertyAccessor follows arbitrary nested setter chains from HTTP form params.
+// "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern"
+// reaches Tomcat AccessLogValve.pattern → attacker-controlled JSP path → RCE.
+
+package org.springframework.beans;
+
+import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
+import java.beans.Introspector;
+import java.beans.PropertyDescriptor;
+import java.lang.reflect.Method;
+import java.util.Map;
+
+public final class DataBinderUnsafe {
+
+    public void bind(Object target, HttpServletRequest req) throws Exception {
+        Map<String, String[]> params = req.getParameterMap();
+        for (Map.Entry<String, String[]> e : params.entrySet()) {
+            String  path  = e.getKey();          /* attacker-controlled */
+            String  value = e.getValue()[0];     /* attacker-controlled */
+            setNestedProperty(target, path, value);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * BUG: traverses dotted paths through ANY introspectable getter chain
+     * without filtering "class"/"classLoader"/sensitive bean traversals.
+     * Under JDK9+ where Class.module is exposed, an attacker can navigate
+     * from any bean → getClass() → module → classLoader → ... → AccessLogValve
+     * → set pattern to an attacker-chosen log path that writes JSP.
+     */
+    private void setNestedProperty(Object root, String dottedPath, String value) throws Exception {
+        String[] parts = dottedPath.split("\\.");
+        Object   cur   = root;
+        for (int i = 0; i < parts.length - 1; ++i) {
+            cur = invokeGetter(cur, parts[i]);
+            if (cur == null) return;
+        }
+        invokeSetter(cur, parts[parts.length - 1], value);
+    }
+
+    private Object invokeGetter(Object obj, String prop) throws Exception {
+        PropertyDescriptor[] descs = Introspector.getBeanInfo(obj.getClass()).getPropertyDescriptors();
+        for (PropertyDescriptor d : descs) {
+            if (d.getName().equals(prop)) {
+                Method m = d.getReadMethod();
+                if (m != null) return m.invoke(obj);
+            }
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+
+    private void invokeSetter(Object obj, String prop, String value) throws Exception {
+        PropertyDescriptor[] descs = Introspector.getBeanInfo(obj.getClass()).getPropertyDescriptors();
+        for (PropertyDescriptor d : descs) {
+            if (d.getName().equals(prop)) {
+                Method m = d.getWriteMethod();
+                if (m != null) { m.invoke(obj, value); return; }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}