feat(ingest): multi-language white-box ingest (web-tree-sitter) (#75)
* chore(ingest): pin web-tree-sitter@0.25.10 + tree-sitter-wasms@0.1.13; add multilang-ingest design docs * feat(ingest): multi-language grammar registry (web-tree-sitter, 8 langs, fail-open); 100% cov * feat(ingest): language-aware param-name splitter (py/go/ts/java/c); 100% cov * feat(ingest): tree-sitter CodeBlock extractor with wall-clock parse budget + fail-open * feat(ingest): cross-lang sinks + multilang config + wire tree-sitter into ingestRepository (sync) * feat(ingest): repoint white-box production callers to multilang config + prod regression test * server-init-wiring: load multi-language grammars once at bootstrap initGrammars() runs after LLM init, before app.listen. Internally fail-open (never rejects): on failure the grammar registry stays empty and ingest falls back to the Python regex parser. * adversarial-tests: hostile-input hardening for untrusted target source Malformed per-language source, wrong-language content, binary/non-UTF8, empty, unicode identifiers, 20k-func large file (wall-clock budget), deeply nested input, and a symlink-loop crawl — all must fail-open, never throw or spin. Drives parseFileMultiLang + ingestRepository/crawl. * readme-status + docs: flip white-box status to multi-language ingest README source-code rows now state web-tree-sitter multi-language ingest (fail-open to Python regex). whitebox.ts scope caveat + no-source error message updated off the stale Python-only wording. * coverage-setup: enforce 100% coverage gate on the three new ingest files vitest.config.ts adds a coverage-only block (v8, perFile thresholds=100) scoped to ts-grammars.ts, param-split.ts, ts-parse.ts. Test discovery and env stay on defaults. Edited files gate on new-branch coverage via the regression suites; the server.ts initGrammars bootstrap line is the documented smoke-covered carve-out. * review: fix WASM heap leak, language-scoped fail-open, sink recall/precision Adversarial security + strict code review (two independent subagents) returned one blocking bug and several correctness findings; remediated: BLOCKING #1 — native WASM memory leak: web-tree-sitter Tree/Parser objects were never .delete()'d. Both reviewers reproduced a process-global wedge: after ~7 large parses the shared WASM heap exhausts, every subsequent parse aborts (caught by fail-open), and non-Python ingest silently returns [] forever. Fix: free the tree in a finally; delete the parser in resetParser. Regression test parses ~8MB through the real shared parser 12x. regex, which mis-parses brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks (wrong line spans, lost methods). Now non-.py fail-open returns [] (honest absence); the Python regex only ever runs on .py. Isolated ts-parse-fallback test. http(s).request, axios(config), C exec-family); negative lookbehind stops bare system(/popen(/fetch( from matching Python receivers (os.system etc. still matched, corpus rankings unchanged). Recall+precision tests added. operator sees non-Python degradation. (one-line call-graph edges, no decorators, C++ member methods). * review round 2: fix sink-regex regressions, real timeout test, deterministic leak guard Third review round (correctness + security re-attack + test-quality) against the round-1 fixes surfaced issues in the fixes themselves; remediated: - Sink-regex regressions I introduced: (1) my fetch lookbehind dropped window.fetch/this.fetch (top JS SSRF idiom) — reverted to \bfetch\(; (2) bare .Get/.Post/.Do flagged db.Get/cache.Get/queue.Do as SSRF — receiver-qualified to [Cc]lient. Recall+precision tests cover both; regex is ReDoS-free (timed). - Placebo leak test: the 12x function-dense loop did NOT wedge the parser on machines with heap headroom (proven: passed with tree.delete removed). Replaced with a deterministic vi.spyOn(Tree.prototype,'delete') assertion, verified RED without the fix. - Real (non-mocked) parse-timeout test: parseFileMultiLang gains an injectable budgetMs; a 0ms budget drives the real progressCallback cancellation to []. - runWhiteboxAnalysis swap now has coverage (spy on orchestrator.run) so the 2nd production caller can't silently revert to the Python-only config. - Un-vacuoused weak tests: unicode now asserts the extracted block; nested/ wrong-language wrapped in invariants() + timing bounds. - CI now runs npm run test:coverage (the 100% gate was defined but unenforced). - Security: documented maxFileBytes as the control bounding a single parse's peak WASM memory below the 2GB heap-abort ceiling. - Stale 'fail-open to Python regex' docs fixed (ts-parse, whitebox, server, adversarial); circular-import note added; temp-dir cleanup; honest coverage wording in spec + config. * docs(ingest): align fallback-contract text with the shipped language-scoped fail-open Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the design docs + one ts-grammars comment still described the pre-implementation 'fall back to the Python regex' model for non-Python files. The shipped contract is language-scoped: .py uses parseFile; any non-.py file with a missing/unsupported/failed grammar or a parse timeout returns [] (never the Python regex, which would mis-parse brace/class syntax into corrupt blocks). Updated every stale reference in multilang-ingest-spec.md, multilang-ingest-plan.md, and ts-grammars.ts so the docs match the security boundary. Docs/comment only — no code change. * fix(test): make the ReDoS wall-clock guard robust under coverage instrumentation Review feedback (#75, @jmagly): the CI step this PR adds (npm run test:coverage = vitest run --coverage) runs the full suite under V8 coverage, and that overhead pushes the pathological-brace DoS timing guard in local-agent-tool-calling.test.ts:69 over its <300ms bound (320 < 300 fails on CI). Raise the bound to 1000ms — still 2x below the ~2100ms quadratic-ReDoS regression it guards against, so it fails hard if the regression returns, but no longer false-fails under coverage/slow CI. Chose the reviewer's option (a) (robust bound) over scoping test:coverage, so the gate stays a simple full-suite run and no test-file enumeration can rot. Verified: npm run test:coverage is green and the 3 new files stay at 100%. * fix(ingest): cover pointer-returning C functions --------- Co-authored-by: Joseph Magly <1159087+jmagly@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -8,16 +8,36 @@
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* itself makes (worker + orchestrator models). It is otherwise pure of network
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* side effects.
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*
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* SCOPE CAVEAT (inherited from code-ingest): the ingest layer is a PYTHON-ONLY,
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* regex "AST-lite" prototype — see recon/code-ingest.ts. It selects which Python
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* blocks to analyze first by security exposure; anything non-`.py` or imported
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* from outside the scan scope is invisible. Do NOT describe this as "any repo".
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* SCOPE CAVEAT (inherited from code-ingest): the ingest layer extracts blocks via
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* web-tree-sitter for Python/JS/TS/Go/Java/C/C++ (Python uses the regex "AST-lite"
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* path; other languages fail-open to [] — never the Python regex — on a grammar
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* miss or parse error) — see recon/code-ingest.ts + recon/ts-parse.ts. It selects which
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* blocks to analyze first by security exposure; a language without a bundled grammar,
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* or code imported from outside the scan scope, is invisible. Do NOT describe this as
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* "any repo" or "any language".
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*
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* KNOWN v1 EXTRACTION LIMITS (fail-safe — these shapes are silently NOT extracted or
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* under-linked, never mis-extracted; all strictly better than the prior Python-only
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* ingest, and tracked as follow-ups):
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* - JS/TS: only `function`/`method`/`class` declarations are captured. Arrow-function
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* and function-expression definitions (`const f = () => …`) are not — idiomatic in
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* modern TS, so their sinks may go unranked.
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* - C++: only free functions are captured. In-class and out-of-line (`Class::method`)
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* member methods are not — a materially narrower C++ story than "full support".
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* - Entry-point elevation for non-Python code relies on name heuristics only; no
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* language emits `decorators`, so annotation-based routes (Spring `@GetMapping`,
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* TS `@Get()`, Express `app.get(...)`) are not elevated to `exposed_externally`.
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* - Call-graph/reachability: buildCallGraph strips a block's signature line before
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* scanning for callees (kept unchanged for Python-benchmark stability), so a
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* SINGLE-LINE non-Python definition (`func F(u) { return G(u) }`) misses the call
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* on that line — the block is still extracted and sink-classified, only the edge
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* is lost.
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*/
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import { config } from '../config/index.js';
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import {
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ingestRepository,
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createPythonIngestConfig,
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createMultiLangIngestConfig,
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packAnalysisUnits,
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} from './code-ingest.js';
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import { DecompositionOrchestrator } from '../orchestration/index.js';
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@@ -218,7 +238,7 @@ export function ingestRepoToSourceContext(
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): RepoSourceContext {
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const source = resolveRepoSourceForAnalysis(repoPath);
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try {
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const result = ingestRepository(createPythonIngestConfig(source.repoPath));
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const result = ingestRepository(createMultiLangIngestConfig(source.repoPath));
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const packed = packAnalysisUnits(result.analysisUnits, tokenBudget);
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return {
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sourceContext: packed.text,
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@@ -302,21 +322,21 @@ export async function runWhiteboxAnalysis(
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// 1) ingest source, security-rank the blocks
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try {
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const result = ingestRepository(createPythonIngestConfig(source.repoPath));
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const result = ingestRepository(createMultiLangIngestConfig(source.repoPath));
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// 2) pack into a generous source view (orchestrator re-packs per-worker itself)
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const packed = packAnalysisUnits(result.analysisUnits, DEFAULT_ANALYSIS_SOURCE_BUDGET);
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const sourceContext = packed.text;
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// Fail loud ONLY when there is genuinely NO source to analyze: 0 ingestable source files
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// (non-Python or empty repo). A valid Python repo that has files but no def/class (a
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// module-level-only script) yields 0 blocks -> empty packed text; that used to run the
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// orchestrator, so we do NOT regress it into a 500 — gate the throw on the file count, not
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// on empty packed text, and let a files>0 repo proceed as before.
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// (no supported-language files, or empty repo). A valid repo that has files but no
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// def/class/func (a module-level-only script) yields 0 blocks -> empty packed text; that
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// used to run the orchestrator, so we do NOT regress it into a 500 — gate the throw on the
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// file count, not on empty packed text, and let a files>0 repo proceed as before.
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if (result.stats.files === 0) {
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throw new Error(
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'white-box analysis has no analyzable source: the repo has 0 ingestable source files ' +
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'(non-Python, or empty). Point repoPath at a Python codebase.',
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'(no supported-language source, or empty). Point repoPath at a code repository.',
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);
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}
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