feat: pack-hunt safety + opt-in Kali+ arsenal + capability-approval gate + tester-feedback UX
Adds three coordinated capabilities and tightens two defaults on purpose — this is safety hardening, NOT a backward-compatible drop-in (see "Tightened defaults"). Fifteen independent adversarial review passes; findings fixed and test-pinned. - Pack-hunt safety: a strict-majority adjudicator with a comment/string/regex/ raw-string/heredoc/POD-aware cite-check (language-gated across C/C++/Py/Rust/Go/ Java/JS/TS/shell/SQL/PHP/Ruby/Perl) so a hallucinated killing-guard can't refute a real finding — the cited comparison's operator must match source, and a string/regex/heredoc/generic-arglist/template-interpolation is blanked before matching. Plus a rate-limit/degraded-health tracker, a global LLM semaphore, and a PackBoard with an atomic claim CAS + snapshot-on-emit/clone-on-ingest. - Opt-in Kali+ arsenal (T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL, OFF by default): 35 default tools (31 built-in + 4 external-CLI wrappers) -> 83 with the catalog armed (verify-claims CLAIM 4). Most adapters need the underlying binary installed. metasploit / hydra / bloodhound are never minted through the generic factory. - Capability-approval + spicy-action gate for the NEW dangerous arsenal only (pre-existing built-ins keep running freely): approve-once, fail-safe deny when unattended, redacted audit trail over SSE. T3MP3ST_GATE_BUILTINS=1 extends it to the spicy built-in probes. Audit redaction is a pure, unit-tested module. Tightened defaults (intentional, ON by default — NOT backward-compatible): - Egress containment: once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse off-scope public hosts (not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private) with SCOPE DENIED — keeps the agent on authorized scope. - Role-specialized operator toolkits: each archetype gets a curated default tool menu (scanner -> scan tools, exploiter -> sqli/xss/etc). Tools stay registered team-wide; the per-role menu is the operator's working set. UX (from live-tester feedback): a one-click "Approve & run" modal when a standard Hunt blocks on an external-target receipt (was a dead-end); bounded-parallel benchmark file ingestion; the deterministic mission-gate chip co-located with the subjective SITREP pace narration (no more "behind schedule" next to a clean gate); and click-through finding detail + evidence in the UI (was export-only). Docs: README + INTEGRITY_LEDGER made re-derivable — honest 35/83 tool count, the egress-containment default documented, and the Cybench number reconciled to the single verify-claims-enforced 23/40 = 58% (dropped the stale/uncited 21 and 26). README voice pass: killed the underselling `Successful Exploits: 0` disqualifier (read as "never popped anything" — false, given CVE-Zero + the live disclosure pipeline); swagger now rests on receipts, not vibes. Also corrected the operator status — the downstream operators run the SAME real tool-backed ReAct loop as recon (not "orchestration stubs"); the honest limit is that the coordinated swarm is unproven (single-agent is the benchmarked path), not that they're scaffolding. Gates: 292 tests, tsc + lint clean, verify-claims 20/20, arsenal:smoke 125/0, disclosure-CLI self-test 11/11. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ export interface Message {
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// TOOL TYPES
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// =============================================================================
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/** A tool's risk tier — the catalog's `risk` vocabulary. Drives the approval + spicy-warning gate
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* (see src/arsenal/approval.ts): intrusive/credential/dangerous require approval; credential/dangerous
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* additionally fire a loud warning. Absent/safe/active tools are ungated. */
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export type RiskTier = 'local_read' | 'passive' | 'active' | 'intrusive' | 'credential' | 'dangerous';
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export interface CustomTool {
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name: string;
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description: string;
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@@ -393,6 +398,8 @@ export interface CustomTool {
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handler: (context: ToolContext) => Promise<ToolResult>;
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parameters?: ToolParameter[];
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requiredPermissions?: string[];
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/** Risk tier carried from the catalog when the tool is a minted adapter — gates approval. */
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riskTier?: RiskTier;
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}
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export interface ToolParameter {
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@@ -541,6 +548,18 @@ export interface CommandEvents {
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'detection:triggered': DetectionEvent;
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'mission:phase_changed': { missionId: string; phase: KillChainPhase };
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'abort:recommended': string;
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/** A capability-approval gate decision (allowed/denied) on an intrusive/dangerous tool — bridged to
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* the dashboard's live approval/audit feed. Structural match for arsenal/approval.ts ApprovalRecord. */
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'approval:decision': {
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tool: string;
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risk: RiskTier;
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operator?: string;
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target?: string;
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action: string;
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outcome: string;
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spicy: boolean;
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at: number;
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};
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}
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// =============================================================================
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