feat: pack-hunt safety + opt-in Kali+ arsenal + capability-approval gate + tester-feedback UX
Adds three coordinated capabilities and tightens two defaults on purpose — this is safety hardening, NOT a backward-compatible drop-in (see "Tightened defaults"). Fifteen independent adversarial review passes; findings fixed and test-pinned. - Pack-hunt safety: a strict-majority adjudicator with a comment/string/regex/ raw-string/heredoc/POD-aware cite-check (language-gated across C/C++/Py/Rust/Go/ Java/JS/TS/shell/SQL/PHP/Ruby/Perl) so a hallucinated killing-guard can't refute a real finding — the cited comparison's operator must match source, and a string/regex/heredoc/generic-arglist/template-interpolation is blanked before matching. Plus a rate-limit/degraded-health tracker, a global LLM semaphore, and a PackBoard with an atomic claim CAS + snapshot-on-emit/clone-on-ingest. - Opt-in Kali+ arsenal (T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL, OFF by default): 35 default tools (31 built-in + 4 external-CLI wrappers) -> 83 with the catalog armed (verify-claims CLAIM 4). Most adapters need the underlying binary installed. metasploit / hydra / bloodhound are never minted through the generic factory. - Capability-approval + spicy-action gate for the NEW dangerous arsenal only (pre-existing built-ins keep running freely): approve-once, fail-safe deny when unattended, redacted audit trail over SSE. T3MP3ST_GATE_BUILTINS=1 extends it to the spicy built-in probes. Audit redaction is a pure, unit-tested module. Tightened defaults (intentional, ON by default — NOT backward-compatible): - Egress containment: once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse off-scope public hosts (not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private) with SCOPE DENIED — keeps the agent on authorized scope. - Role-specialized operator toolkits: each archetype gets a curated default tool menu (scanner -> scan tools, exploiter -> sqli/xss/etc). Tools stay registered team-wide; the per-role menu is the operator's working set. UX (from live-tester feedback): a one-click "Approve & run" modal when a standard Hunt blocks on an external-target receipt (was a dead-end); bounded-parallel benchmark file ingestion; the deterministic mission-gate chip co-located with the subjective SITREP pace narration (no more "behind schedule" next to a clean gate); and click-through finding detail + evidence in the UI (was export-only). Docs: README + INTEGRITY_LEDGER made re-derivable — honest 35/83 tool count, the egress-containment default documented, and the Cybench number reconciled to the single verify-claims-enforced 23/40 = 58% (dropped the stale/uncited 21 and 26). README voice pass: killed the underselling `Successful Exploits: 0` disqualifier (read as "never popped anything" — false, given CVE-Zero + the live disclosure pipeline); swagger now rests on receipts, not vibes. Also corrected the operator status — the downstream operators run the SAME real tool-backed ReAct loop as recon (not "orchestration stubs"); the honest limit is that the coordinated swarm is unproven (single-agent is the benchmarked path), not that they're scaffolding. Gates: 292 tests, tsc + lint clean, verify-claims 20/20, arsenal:smoke 125/0, disclosure-CLI self-test 11/11. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ export interface AgentLoopOptions {
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maxTokens?: number;
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/** Tool categories to expose (default: all) */
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toolCategories?: string[];
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/** Explicit tool-NAME allowlist — the operator's role toolkit. Overrides toolCategories. */
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tools?: string[];
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/** Whether to include detailed tool output in context (default: true) */
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verboseToolOutput?: boolean;
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/** Max characters per tool result before truncation (default: 4000) */
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@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ export class AgentLoop extends EventEmitter<AgentEvents> {
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maxIterations: options?.maxIterations ?? 15,
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maxTokens: options?.maxTokens ?? 50000,
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toolCategories: options?.toolCategories ?? [],
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tools: options?.tools ?? [],
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verboseToolOutput: options?.verboseToolOutput ?? true,
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maxToolOutputLength: options?.maxToolOutputLength ?? 4000,
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};
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@@ -114,9 +117,11 @@ export class AgentLoop extends EventEmitter<AgentEvents> {
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const seenCalls = new Map<string, string>();
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let noProgress = 0;
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// Get tool definitions from Arsenal
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// Get tool definitions from Arsenal (the operator's role toolkit: name allowlist wins,
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// then category filter, then all).
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const toolDefs = this.arsenal.getToolDefinitions(
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this.options.toolCategories.length > 0 ? this.options.toolCategories : undefined
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this.options.toolCategories.length > 0 ? this.options.toolCategories : undefined,
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this.options.tools.length > 0 ? this.options.tools : undefined
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);
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// Build initial messages
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@@ -308,7 +313,10 @@ export class AgentLoop extends EventEmitter<AgentEvents> {
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// A bad/hallucinated tool name must NOT crash the loop. Return the callable set so the
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// model self-corrects in-place instead of dying or looping on a tool that doesn't exist.
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const available = this.arsenal
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.getToolDefinitions(this.options.toolCategories.length ? this.options.toolCategories : undefined)
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.getToolDefinitions(
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this.options.toolCategories.length ? this.options.toolCategories : undefined,
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this.options.tools.length ? this.options.tools : undefined
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)
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.map((t) => t.name);
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toolResult = {
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success: false,
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