Merge pull request #99 from jmagly/pr-delivery-74-94-18-39-41

Deliver repaired PR batch (#74 #94 #18 #39 #41)

.gitignore

@@ -63,3 +63,5 @@ scripts/.export-denylist.local
 .aiwg/*
 !.aiwg/addons/
 !.aiwg/addons/**
+
+server.pid

README.md

@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ The framework is an 8-operator kill chain, and this table won't blow smoke about
 | Re-derivable measurement (`verify-claims`) | ✅ Stable | every headline recomputes from committed artifacts |
 | Recon engine | ✅ Stable | drives nmap / DNS / HTTP / fingerprinting; every finding traces to real tool output |
 | Mission engine + War Room + Op Admiral | ✅ Stable | keyless through a connected local agent |
-| Arsenal, MCP server, HTTP API | ✅ Stable | 35 built-in tools by default; 83 with the opt-in `T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL` (+48 adapters, with the dangerous post-ex drivers — metasploit, hydra — behind a human-approval gate) — both counts re-derive via `verify-claims`. `security_recon` over MCP |
+| Arsenal, MCP server, HTTP API | ✅ Stable | 35 built-in tools by default; 102 with the opt-in `T3MP3ST_FULL_ARSENAL` (+67 adapters, with dangerous/catalog-only drivers — metasploit, hydra, pacu, frida — behind narrow approved paths rather than generic execution) — both counts re-derive via `verify-claims`. `security_recon` over MCP |
 | Egress-scope containment | ✅ Stable (on by default) | once a mission target is set, built-in networked tools refuse off-scope public hosts — not the target/subdomains, not loopback/private (`SCOPE DENIED`) — a tightened default, not a bare tool runner |
 | Coordinated-disclosure pipeline | ✅ Stable | OSV novelty + live PoC + refuter panel + CVSS; drafts only, a human sends |
 | White-box source analysis | ⚠️ Experimental | Python-only regex ingest; multi-model decomposition costs more tokens, not fewer |

scripts/verify-claims.mjs

@@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ check('VERIFY gate implemented', /VERIFY gate|never appeared in tool output/.tes
 check('REFLECT gate implemented', /REFLECT gate/.test(bench), 'forced mid-run pivot');
 
 // ── CLAIM 4: capability breadth ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-console.log('\nCLAIM 4 — capability: 83 tools, 8-operator kill-chain');
+console.log('\nCLAIM 4 — capability: 102 tools, 8-operator kill-chain');
 // DISTINCT tools = external-binary adapters (catalog.ts TOOL_ADAPTERS id:) + custom
-// built-in tools (index.ts BUILTIN_TOOLS top-level name:). NOT a name:/id: regex count
+// built-in/external tools (index.ts top-level name:). NOT a name:/id: regex count
 // (that double-counts each tool's id+name AND every parameter name).
 const catalogSrc = fs.existsSync(R('src/arsenal/catalog.ts')) ? fs.readFileSync(R('src/arsenal/catalog.ts'), 'utf8') : '';
 const indexSrc = fs.existsSync(R('src/arsenal/index.ts')) ? fs.readFileSync(R('src/arsenal/index.ts'), 'utf8') : '';
@@ -229,6 +229,48 @@ console.log('\nCLAIM 7 — CVE-Zero-v2 (held-out): hunt generalizes to fresh uns
   }
 }
 
+// ── INTEGRITY GATE: every scored solve is oracle-grounded (no phantom pass) ───
+// Every check above credits a solve straight from the committed `verdict` (detected /
+// score===1). This gate closes the obvious tamper hole in that trust: a scored solve must
+// still AGREE with its own committed flag oracle. A solve is oracle-grounded iff EITHER the
+// agent's self-reported flag matches the committed `expected` under the same case-insensitive
+// compare the harness uses (ciMatch), OR the harness auto-detected `expected` verbatim in tool
+// output (auto_detected — the agent didn't self-report, so `reported` may be "UNKNOWN").
+// Anything scored as a solve that is NEITHER is a phantom pass: a hand-edited `detected:true`
+// whose committed oracle does not back it. This wires ciMatch (until now defined but unused)
+// into an executable gate, and rejects a fabricated placeholder credited via the self-report path.
+console.log('\nINTEGRITY GATE — every committed solve is oracle-grounded (no phantom pass, no fabricated flag)');
+const oracleGrounded = (v) =>
+  ciMatch(v.reported, v.expected) || v.auto_detected === true || /auto-?detected/i.test(String(v.reason || ''));
+const scanSolves = (files) => {
+  let solves = 0, phantom = 0, fabricated = 0, grounded = 0;
+  for (const f of files) {
+    const v = (((JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(f, 'utf8')).results) || [{}])[0] || {}).verdict || {};
+    if (!(v.detected === true || v.score === 1)) continue;
+    solves++;
+    if (oracleGrounded(v)) grounded++; else phantom++;
+    // A fabricated placeholder may only ever be "credited" via the self-report path.
+    if (ciMatch(v.reported, v.expected) && looksFabricated(v.reported)) fabricated++;
+  }
+  return { solves, phantom, fabricated, grounded };
+};
+const xbenFiles = [...BESTBALL_DIRS, ...WHITEBOX_DIRS].flatMap((sub) =>
+  glob(R('bench/xbow/results/' + sub), /^xben_\d+_24.*\.json$/));
+const cybenchFiles = [...glob(R('bench/cybench/results'), /^clean-.*\.json$/),
+                      ...glob(R('bench/cybench/results'), /^service-cybsvc_.*\.json$/)];
+const ig = scanSolves([...xbenFiles, ...cybenchFiles]);
+check('every scored solve is oracle-grounded (self-report ≡ committed oracle, or auto-detected)',
+  ig.phantom === 0, `${ig.phantom} phantom / ${ig.solves} scored solves`);
+check('no fabricated placeholder flag is credited as a self-reported solve',
+  ig.fabricated === 0, `${ig.fabricated} fabricated / ${ig.solves} scored solves`);
+// Informational — how much of the Cybench headline is backed by an oracle-bearing per-run
+// artifact vs. counted only in the hand-editable aggregate (transcripts are stripped on export).
+{
+  const cRun = scanSolves(cybenchFiles);
+  const aggSolved = fs.existsSync(cf) ? JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(cf, 'utf8')).solved : null;
+  console.log(`  ℹ️  Cybench: aggregate reports ${aggSolved} solved · ${cRun.grounded} oracle-grounded per-run artifact(s) committed · ${(aggSolved ?? 0) - cRun.grounded} aggregate-only`);
+}
+
 // ── verdict ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 console.log(`\n════════ ${fail === 0 ? '✅ ALL CLAIMS VERIFIED' : `❌ ${fail} CHECK(S) FAILED`} — ${pass} passed, ${fail} failed ════════\n`);
 process.exit(fail === 0 ? 0 : 1);

src/__tests__/arsenal-count-honesty.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { TOOL_ADAPTERS, type ToolAdapter } from '../arsenal/catalog.js';
+import { BUILTIN_TOOLS, EXTERNAL_TOOLS } from '../arsenal/index.js';
+import {
+  isMintable,
+  adapterToCustomTool,
+  toolNameFor,
+  type AdapterToolDeps,
+} from '../arsenal/adapter-tools.js';
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// ARSENAL COUNT HONESTY — the "advertised = real, and nothing is silently dead".
+//
+// The arsenal advertises "102 tools". verify-claims defends that number by counting
+// `id:`/`name:` source lines — a SOURCE-LINE count, which would keep passing even if
+// an entry became uncallable. This test locks the number to the REAL registered arrays
+// and, more importantly, pins the invariant that makes the count honest:
+//
+//   an adapter is OFF the generic callable surface (adapterToCustomTool → null) IFF it
+//   is EXPLICITLY gated by its execution mode (catalog_only / import_only).
+//
+// i.e. a tool can be counted-but-not-generically-callable ONLY on purpose (metasploit /
+// hydra reachable solely via the approval-gated post-ex drivers; bloodhound import-only;
+// pacu/frida catalog-only until narrow approved runners exist),
+// never by a silent DEFAULT/mint slip. Sibling of no-phantom-tools / stub-honesty.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const deps: AdapterToolDeps = {
+  isToolAvailable: async () => true,
+  runSubprocess: async () => ({ stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 }),
+};
+
+const isGated = (a: ToolAdapter) =>
+  a.execution === 'catalog_only' || a.execution === 'import_only';
+
+describe('arsenal count honesty (advertised = real registered surface)', () => {
+  it('the advertised "102 tools" is the real registered surface, not a source-line count', () => {
+    const total = TOOL_ADAPTERS.length + BUILTIN_TOOLS.length + EXTERNAL_TOOLS.length;
+    // Locks the headline to code. If the arsenal grows/shrinks, update this AND the
+    // README / verify-claims headline together — that is the point of the lock.
+    expect(
+      total,
+      `arsenal size drifted from the advertised 102 (adapters=${TOOL_ADAPTERS.length}, ` +
+        `built-ins=${BUILTIN_TOOLS.length}, externals=${EXTERNAL_TOOLS.length}) — ` +
+        'update the README / verify-claims headline to match',
+    ).toBe(102);
+    expect(total).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(80); // stays consistent with verify-claims' `>= 80` gate
+  });
+
+  it('an adapter is off the generic callable surface IFF it is explicitly gated (no silent-dead entry)', () => {
+    const silentlyDead: string[] = []; // counted, not gated, yet mints null
+    const wronglyGated: string[] = []; // gated, yet somehow mints a callable tool
+    for (const a of TOOL_ADAPTERS) {
+      const callable = adapterToCustomTool(a, deps) !== null;
+      if (!callable && !isGated(a)) silentlyDead.push(`${a.id} (${a.execution})`);
+      if (callable && isGated(a)) wronglyGated.push(`${a.id} (${a.execution})`);
+      // isMintable must agree with actual callability — no divergence.
+      expect(isMintable(a), `isMintable disagrees with callability for ${a.id}`).toBe(callable);
+    }
+    expect(silentlyDead, `counted-but-silently-uncallable adapters: ${silentlyDead.join(', ')}`).toEqual([]);
+    expect(wronglyGated, `gated adapters that are still generically callable: ${wronglyGated.join(', ')}`).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('the gated set is exactly the documented post-ex / import tools', () => {
+    const gated = TOOL_ADAPTERS.filter(isGated);
+    // metasploit + hydra are catalog_only (callable only via the approval-gated hand-written
+    // post-ex drivers); pacu/frida are catalog_only pending narrow approved runners; bloodhound is
+    // import_only (collector output is imported, never run here).
+    expect(gated.map((a) => a.id).sort()).toEqual(['bloodhound', 'frida', 'hydra', 'metasploit', 'pacu']);
+    expect(TOOL_ADAPTERS.find((a) => a.id === 'bloodhound')?.execution).toBe('import_only');
+    // Every gated adapter is genuinely off the generic surface.
+    for (const a of gated) {
+      expect(adapterToCustomTool(a, deps), `${a.id} must not be generically callable`).toBeNull();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('every generically-callable adapter mints a real, uniquely-named tool', () => {
+    const names = new Set<string>();
+    for (const t of [...BUILTIN_TOOLS, ...EXTERNAL_TOOLS]) names.add(t.name);
+    for (const a of TOOL_ADAPTERS) {
+      const tool = adapterToCustomTool(a, deps);
+      if (!tool) continue; // gated — covered above
+      expect(typeof tool.handler, `${a.id} minted without a handler`).toBe('function');
+      expect(tool.name, `${a.id} minted an unexpected name`).toBe(toolNameFor(a));
+      // A minted adapter that shadows a hand-written tool name is deduped by buildAdapterTools;
+      // record it here to prove no two DISTINCT registered surfaces collide unexpectedly.
+      names.add(tool.name);
+    }
+    // Built-ins + externals themselves carry no duplicate names.
+    const builtinNames = [...BUILTIN_TOOLS, ...EXTERNAL_TOOLS].map((t) => t.name);
+    expect(new Set(builtinNames).size).toBe(builtinNames.length);
+  });
+});

src/__tests__/local-agent-path-resolution.test.ts

@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@
  * These tests pin the resolver in isolation, the detector wiring, AND the two spawn call-sites
  * (runLocalAgent / localAgentChat) the fix rewired — all through the public API.
  *
- * POSIX-only by design: `resolveBin` short-circuits on win32 (Windows resolution — where.exe /
- * .cmd shims — is PR #18's domain, deliberately not duplicated here). The win32 case is asserted
- * via a platform stub so the boundary is documented and locked.
+ * POSIX-focused, with a small Windows boundary assertion: unresolved Windows shims fail closed
+ * instead of returning a bare name that would bypass the safe .cmd/.bat launch path.
  */
 import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
 import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, symlinkSync, rmSync } from 'fs';
@@ -155,7 +154,7 @@ describe('resolveBin — macOS/POSIX well-known-dir resolution (issue #78)', ()
     expect(resolveBin('definitely-not-a-real-cli-xyz')).toBe('definitely-not-a-real-cli-xyz');
   });
 
-  it('does NOT scan on win32 — returns the bare name (Windows resolution is PR #18\'s domain)', () => {
+  it('does NOT scan POSIX dirs on win32 — unresolved shims fail closed', () => {
     const home = scratch();
     putExe(join(home, '.local', 'bin'), 'faketool');
     process.env.T3MP3ST_AGENT_HOME = home;
@@ -163,7 +162,7 @@ describe('resolveBin — macOS/POSIX well-known-dir resolution (issue #78)', ()
     const orig = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process, 'platform') || { value: process.platform, configurable: true };
     Object.defineProperty(process, 'platform', { value: 'win32', configurable: true });
     try {
-      expect(resolveBin('faketool')).toBe('faketool');
+      expect(resolveBin('faketool')).toBeUndefined();
     } finally {
       Object.defineProperty(process, 'platform', orig);
     }

src/__tests__/oracle-consistency.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// NO PHANTOM PASS — the "scored = oracle-backed" guard for the benchmark receipts.
+//
+// `verify-claims` credits a solve straight from the committed `verdict` (detected /
+// score===1). The launch risk is the mirror of a phantom tool: a phantom PASS — a
+// committed `detected:true` that its own committed flag oracle does not actually back
+// (a hand-edit, a merge slip, a fabricated placeholder flag). This test makes that fail
+// the build by construction — the same discipline as no-phantom-tools, applied to the
+// bench artifacts the headline numbers are re-derived from.
+//
+// A scored solve is ORACLE-GROUNDED iff EITHER the agent's self-reported flag matches the
+// committed `expected` under the harness's case-insensitive compare (ciMatch), OR the
+// harness auto-detected `expected` verbatim in tool output (auto_detected — the agent did
+// not self-report, so `reported` may be "UNKNOWN"). Anything else scored as a solve is a
+// phantom pass.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Same helpers verify-claims.mjs uses, re-derived here so the gate is independent of it.
+const ciMatch = (a: unknown, b: unknown) =>
+  !!a && !!b && String(a).trim().toLowerCase() === String(b).trim().toLowerCase();
+
+function looksFabricated(flag: unknown): boolean {
+  if (!flag) return false;
+  const inner = (String(flag).match(/\{([\s\S]*)\}/) || ['', ''])[1]
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .replace(/4/g, 'a').replace(/3/g, 'e').replace(/0/g, 'o')
+    .replace(/1/g, 'i').replace(/5/g, 's').replace(/7/g, 't');
+  return /\b(fake|placeholder|dummy|redacted|todo|tbd)\b|fake_?flag|for_?test|_?test(ing)?_?(flag|local|stub|only)|local_?test|real_[a-z]+_proof|proof_?xyz|sample_?flag|your_?flag_?here|example_?flag|replace_?me|flag_?here/.test(inner);
+}
+
+interface Verdict {
+  detected?: boolean;
+  score?: number;
+  reported?: string;
+  expected?: string;
+  auto_detected?: boolean;
+  reason?: string;
+}
+
+const isScoredSolve = (v: Verdict) => v.detected === true || v.score === 1;
+const isOracleGrounded = (v: Verdict) =>
+  ciMatch(v.reported, v.expected) ||
+  v.auto_detected === true ||
+  /auto-?detected/i.test(String(v.reason || ''));
+// A phantom pass: credited as a solve, but not backed by its own committed oracle.
+const isPhantomPass = (v: Verdict) => isScoredSolve(v) && !isOracleGrounded(v);
+// A fabricated credit: a placeholder flag credited via the self-report (oracle-match) path.
+const isFabricatedCredit = (v: Verdict) =>
+  isScoredSolve(v) && ciMatch(v.reported, v.expected) && looksFabricated(v.reported);
+
+// ── Load the committed XBEN artifacts the headline sweeps are pinned to ──────
+const REPO = process.cwd();
+const XBEN = path.join(REPO, 'bench', 'xbow', 'results');
+const PINNED_DIRS = [
+  'blackbox-golden', 'blackbox-golden-v2', 'blackbox-golden-final',
+  'whitebox-golden', 'whitebox-golden-v2', 'venice-whitebox',
+];
+
+function firstVerdict(file: string): Verdict {
+  const d = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
+  return ((d.results || [{}])[0] || {}).verdict || {};
+}
+
+function committedSolves(): Verdict[] {
+  const out: Verdict[] = [];
+  for (const dir of PINNED_DIRS) {
+    const abs = path.join(XBEN, dir);
+    if (!fs.existsSync(abs)) continue;
+    for (const f of fs.readdirSync(abs).filter((n) => /^xben_\d+_24.*\.json$/.test(n))) {
+      const v = firstVerdict(path.join(abs, f));
+      if (isScoredSolve(v)) out.push(v);
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+describe('no phantom pass (scored = oracle-backed)', () => {
+  it('finds a non-trivial set of committed, scored solves to audit', () => {
+    // Guard against the vacuous-green failure mode: if the artifacts moved and we scan
+    // nothing, the "0 phantom" assertions below would pass while checking nothing.
+    expect(committedSolves().length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(100);
+  });
+
+  it('every committed scored solve is oracle-grounded (self-report ≡ oracle, or auto-detected)', () => {
+    const phantoms = committedSolves().filter(isPhantomPass);
+    expect(
+      phantoms,
+      `committed solves not backed by their own oracle: ${phantoms
+        .map((v) => `reported=${JSON.stringify(v.reported)} expected=${JSON.stringify(v.expected)}`)
+        .join('; ')}`,
+    ).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('no fabricated placeholder flag is credited as a self-reported solve', () => {
+    const fabricated = committedSolves().filter(isFabricatedCredit);
+    expect(fabricated).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  // ── The gate must have TEETH: prove it rejects tampered artifacts, not just that
+  //    today's clean data passes. Otherwise a future hand-edit sails through. ──
+  it('rejects a hand-edited detected:true whose oracle does not match (reported ≠ expected)', () => {
+    const tampered: Verdict = {
+      detected: true,
+      score: 1,
+      reported: 'FLAG{claimed_but_wrong}',
+      expected: 'FLAG{the_real_committed_flag}',
+      auto_detected: false,
+      reason: 'exact match',
+    };
+    expect(isPhantomPass(tampered)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a fabricated placeholder flag even when reported === expected', () => {
+    const fabricated: Verdict = {
+      detected: true,
+      score: 1,
+      reported: 'FLAG{local_test_flag}',
+      expected: 'FLAG{local_test_flag}',
+      reason: 'exact match',
+    };
+    expect(isPhantomPass(fabricated)).toBe(false); // reported === expected, so not "phantom"…
+    expect(isFabricatedCredit(fabricated)).toBe(true); // …but the fabrication filter catches it.
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a legitimate auto-detected solve (agent did not self-report; harness found the flag)', () => {
+    const autoDetected: Verdict = {
+      detected: false,
+      score: 1,
+      reported: 'UNKNOWN',
+      expected: 'FLAG{0e640864c2718bb34e01e700391986e28ecd6fbe98b4569ef4ccc4cee16a4b2c}',
+      auto_detected: true,
+      reason: 'auto-detected: expected flag verbatim in tool output (agent did not self-report)',
+    };
+    expect(isPhantomPass(autoDetected)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

src/agent/local-agents.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ export function agentHome(): string {
 }
 const expand = (p: string): string => (p.startsWith('~') ? agentHome() + p.slice(1) : p);
 
+/**
+ * Resolve a path under the OS-native per-user local app-data root, cross-platform:
+ *   - Windows: %LOCALAPPDATA% (e.g. C:\Users\<u>\AppData\Local), where the Hermes desktop app
+ *     stores its runtime auth under %LOCALAPPDATA%\hermes\ rather than ~/.hermes/.
+ *   - POSIX:   <agentHome>/AppData/Local fallback (harmless: the artifact simply won't exist there).
+ * PRESENCE-ONLY: callers pass the result to existsSync(); contents are never read.
+ */
+const localAppData = (rel: string): string =>
+  join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || join(agentHome(), 'AppData', 'Local'), ...rel.split('/'));
+
 /**
  * Env for a spawned agent CLI. Two adjustments to our own env:
  *   - strip the injected provider keys so the CLI falls back to its OWN native login (not t3mp3st's).
@@ -147,7 +157,10 @@ const SPECS: AgentSpec[] = [
     invokeHint: 'hermes -z "<prompt>"  (--yolo only if T3MP3ST_HERMES_YOLO=1)',
     versionArgs: ['--version'],
     parseVersion: (o) => (o.match(/v([\d]+\.[\d]+(\.[\d]+)?)/)?.[1]) || (o.match(/[\d]+\.[\d]+(\.[\d]+)?/) || ['?'])[0],
-    authArtifacts: ['~/.hermes/.env', "~/.hermes/auth.json"],
+    // Hermes desktop on Windows stores its login under %LOCALAPPDATA%\hermes\ (NOT ~/.hermes/), so
+    // checking only ~/.hermes/ made an authed Windows install read as NOT AUTHED. Presence-only check;
+    // ~/.hermes/auth.json is upstream's POSIX/mac auth artifact, kept alongside the Windows paths.
+    authArtifacts: ['~/.hermes/.env', "~/.hermes/auth.json", localAppData('hermes/.env'), localAppData('hermes/auth.json')],
     oneShot: (p, m) => ['-z', p, ...(hermesYoloEnabled() ? ['--yolo'] : []), ...(m ? ['-m', m] : [])],
   },
 ];
@@ -182,6 +195,10 @@ export interface AgentDetection {
   ready: boolean;      // installed && authed
 }
 
+const isWin32 = (): boolean => process.platform === 'win32';
+// Kept as a constructed RegExp so the source never embeds a raw CRLF inside a regex literal.
+const NEWLINE_RE = new RegExp('\\r?\\n');
+
 /**
  * Curated POSIX install dirs an agent CLI commonly lands in, under the REAL agent home (issue #78).
  *
@@ -221,16 +238,28 @@ function wellKnownBinDirs(home: string): string[] {
 }
 
 /**
- * Absolute path to `bin`, resolved WITHOUT a shell against PATH plus the well-known install dirs
- * (issue #78). Fail-open: an unresolved name is returned unchanged so `execFile`/`spawn` still throw
- * the same ENOENT (→ `installed:false`) they did before — no behavior change when a CLI is truly
- * absent. Pure-fs (no shell) so it can't hang or be injected, and it uses an X_OK access check to
- * match `execFile`'s own executable-file semantics (a non-executable name-collision is skipped, not
- * returned). win32 is intentionally NOT handled here (where.exe / .cmd-shim resolution is PR #18's
- * domain) — the bare name is returned so Node's own %PATH%/PATHEXT lookup stays in effect.
+ * Absolute path to `bin`, resolved WITHOUT an operator-controlled shell:
+ *   - Windows: where.exe honors PATHEXT, preferring .exe > .cmd > .bat > first hit.
+ *   - POSIX: PATH plus well-known install dirs under agentHome() (issue #78).
+ *
+ * POSIX fail-open: an unresolved name is returned unchanged so `execFile`/`spawn` still throw the
+ * same ENOENT (→ installed:false) they did before. Windows fail-closed: an unresolved npm shim must
+ * not be spawned as a bare name because .cmd/.bat launches need explicit shell handling.
  */
-export function resolveBin(bin: string): string {
-  if (process.platform === 'win32' || bin.includes('/')) return bin;
+export function resolveBin(bin: string): string | undefined {
+  if (isWin32()) {
+    try {
+      const out = execFileSync('where.exe', [bin], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 5000 });
+      const hits = out.split(NEWLINE_RE).map((h) => h.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+      return (
+        hits.find((h) => /\.exe$/i.test(h)) ??
+        hits.find((h) => /\.cmd$/i.test(h)) ??
+        hits.find((h) => /\.bat$/i.test(h)) ??
+        hits[0]
+      );
+    } catch { return undefined; }
+  }
+  if (bin.includes('/')) return bin;
   const path = process.env.PATH || '';
   for (const dir of [...path.split(':'), ...wellKnownBinDirs(agentHome())]) {
     // Absolute dirs only: skips blank PATH segments (whose POSIX "= cwd" meaning is a known
@@ -248,6 +277,23 @@ export function resolveBin(bin: string): string {
   return bin;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Windows-safe launcher for a resolved agent binary.
+ *
+ * A `.cmd`/`.bat` shim can't be spawned with shell:false on Windows. It must run through cmd.exe, but
+ * hand-rolling `spawn('cmd.exe', ['/d','/s','/c', shim, ...args])` is unsafe because cmd.exe re-parses
+ * the command tail with its own quoting rules. Letting Node launch the resolved shim with shell:true
+ * uses Node's patched argument escaping path, so adversarial prompt text stays a literal argument.
+ */
+function spawnAgent(resolvedBin: string, args: string[], options: import('child_process').SpawnOptions): import('child_process').ChildProcess {
+  if (needsShell(resolvedBin)) return spawn(resolvedBin, args, { ...options, shell: true });
+  return spawn(resolvedBin, args, { ...options, shell: false });
+}
+
+function needsShell(resolvedBin: string): boolean {
+  return isWin32() && /\.(cmd|bat)$/i.test(resolvedBin);
+}
+
 function authState(spec: AgentSpec): { authed: boolean; method?: string } {
   for (const a of spec.authArtifacts) {
     if (existsSync(expand(a))) return { authed: true, method: 'file' };
@@ -269,29 +315,45 @@ function detectOne(spec: AgentSpec): Promise<AgentDetection> {
     id: spec.id, label: spec.label, vendor: spec.vendor, bin: spec.bin,
     blurb: spec.blurb, invokeHint: spec.invokeHint,
   };
-  // Resolve against PATH + well-known install dirs so a Finder/desktop launch's minimal PATH
-  // doesn't hide an installed CLI (issue #78). Absolute when found; the bare name otherwise
-  // (→ execFile throws the same ENOENT → installed:false, preserving the true-absence path).
-  const exe = resolveBin(spec.bin);
+  // POSIX falls back to the bare name when unresolved; Windows keeps `resolved` authoritative because
+  // bare npm .cmd/.bat shims require explicit shell handling after where.exe resolution.
+  const exe = resolveBin(spec.bin) || (isWin32() ? undefined : spec.bin);
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    execFile(exe, spec.versionArgs, { timeout: 8000 }, (err, stdout) => {
-      if (err && (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
-        resolve({ ...base, installed: false, authed: false, ready: false });
-        return;
-      }
-      // even a non-zero exit but no ENOENT means the binary exists
-      const version = spec.parseVersion(String(stdout || ''));
+    if (!exe) {
+      resolve({ ...base, installed: false, authed: false, ready: false });
+      return;
+    }
+    const installedNoVersion = () => {
       const auth = authState(spec);
       resolve({
-        ...base,
-        installed: true,
-        path: exe !== spec.bin ? exe : undefined,
-        version,
-        authed: auth.authed,
-        authMethod: auth.method,
-        ready: auth.authed,
+        ...base, installed: true, path: exe !== spec.bin ? exe : undefined, version: '?',
+        authed: auth.authed, authMethod: auth.method, ready: auth.authed,
       });
-    });
+    };
+    try {
+      execFile(exe, spec.versionArgs, { timeout: 8000, shell: needsShell(exe) }, (err, stdout) => {
+        if (err && (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
+          resolve({ ...base, installed: false, authed: false, ready: false });
+          return;
+        }
+        // even a non-zero exit but no ENOENT means the binary exists
+        const version = spec.parseVersion(String(stdout || ''));
+        const auth = authState(spec);
+        resolve({
+          ...base,
+          installed: true,
+          path: exe !== spec.bin ? exe : undefined,
+          version,
+          authed: auth.authed,
+          authMethod: auth.method,
+          ready: auth.authed,
+        });
+      });
+    } catch {
+      // Synchronous spawn failures (for example restricted child-process creation) should not reject
+      // the whole detection batch; the binary exists, but its version could not be probed.
+      installedNoVersion();
+    }
   });
 }
 
@@ -301,7 +363,15 @@ export async function detectLocalAgents(): Promise<AgentDetection[]> {
   // local-agent auto-detection) so key-required / fail-closed paths can be exercised
   // deterministically — used by scripts/arsenal-smoke.mjs for a reproducible run.
   if (/^(1|true|yes|on)$/i.test((process.env.T3MP3ST_DISABLE_LOCAL_AGENTS || '').trim())) return [];
-  return Promise.all(SPECS.map(detectOne));
+  const settled = await Promise.allSettled(SPECS.map(detectOne));
+  return settled.map((r, i) => {
+    if (r.status === 'fulfilled') return r.value;
+    const s = SPECS[i];
+    return {
+      id: s.id, label: s.label, vendor: s.vendor, bin: s.bin, blurb: s.blurb,
+      invokeHint: s.invokeHint, installed: false, authed: false, ready: false,
+    };
+  });
 }
 
 export interface AgentRunResult {
@@ -340,11 +410,10 @@ export function runLocalAgent(
   const maxChars = opts.maxChars ?? 4000;
   // child env: provider keys stripped + HOME pinned to the real agent home (see childEnv).
   const env = childEnv();
+  const resolvedBin = resolveBin(spec.bin) || spec.bin;
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
     // stdin:'ignore' so the agent doesn't stall waiting on piped input (e.g. `claude -p`'s 3s stdin wait).
-    // resolveBin: same PATH-robust resolution the detector uses, so a CLI detected under a minimal
-    // launchd PATH also SPAWNS (detected-but-unspawnable would be worse than undetected) — issue #78.
-    const child = spawn(resolveBin(spec.bin), args, { env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
+    const child = spawnAgent(resolvedBin, args, { env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
     let out = '';
     let errOut = '';
     let done = false;
@@ -406,9 +475,9 @@ export function localAgentChat(id: string, prompt: string, opts: { model?: strin
   }
 
   const cleanup = () => { if (workDir) { try { rmSync(workDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* noop */ } } };
+  const resolvedBin = resolveBin(spec.bin) || spec.bin;
   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    // resolveBin: PATH-robust resolution (issue #78) — see runLocalAgent.
-    const child = spawn(resolveBin(spec.bin), args, { env, stdio: [viaStdin ? 'pipe' : 'ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
+    const child = spawnAgent(resolvedBin, args, { env, stdio: [viaStdin ? 'pipe' : 'ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
     let out = '';
     let errOut = '';
     let done = false;

src/config/index.ts

@@ -537,10 +537,14 @@ class ConfigManager {
       join(homedir(), '.env'),
     ];
 
+    let envProvider: string | undefined;
+
     for (const envPath of envPaths) {
       if (existsSync(envPath)) {
         const envContent = readFileSync(envPath, 'utf-8');
         const lines = envContent.split('\n');
+        // Validation variables added
+        const VALID_PROVIDERS = ['openrouter', 'venice', 'anthropic', 'openai', 'xai', 'gemini', 'local'];
 
         for (const line of lines) {
           const trimmed = line.trim();
@@ -553,9 +557,18 @@ class ConfigManager {
             // empty OPENROUTER_API_KEY= — the .env file no longer clobbers it.
             if (key && value && process.env[key] === undefined) {
               process.env[key] = value;
+
+              // Track LLM_PROVIDER for default provider
+              if (key === 'LLM_PROVIDER' && VALID_PROVIDERS.includes(value.toLowerCase())) {
+                envProvider = value.toLowerCase();
+              }
             }
           }
         }
+        // Set TEMPEST_DEFAULT_PROVIDER if LLM_PROVIDER found
+        if (envProvider && !process.env.TEMPEST_DEFAULT_PROVIDER) {
+          process.env.TEMPEST_DEFAULT_PROVIDER = envProvider;
+        }
         break;
       }
     }
@@ -674,7 +687,16 @@ class ConfigManager {
    * Get the LLM configuration for the default or specified provider
    */
   getLLMConfig(provider?: LLMProvider, model?: string): LLMConfig {
-    const actualProvider = provider || this.config.get('defaultProvider');
+    let actualProvider = provider;
+
+    if (!actualProvider) {
+      const envProvider = process.env.TEMPEST_DEFAULT_PROVIDER?.trim();
+      if (envProvider) {
+        actualProvider = envProvider as LLMProvider;
+      } else {
+        actualProvider = this.config.get('defaultProvider');
+      }
+    }
 
     let apiKey: string | undefined;
     let baseUrl: string | undefined;

src/server.ts

@@ -181,6 +181,25 @@ function isLoopbackOrigin(originHeader: string | undefined): boolean {
   }
 }
 
+// #84: a SAME-ORIGIN request — the caller's Origin (or Referer) host:port equals THIS server's
+// own Host header — is by definition not a foreign-website drive-by. It is trusted ONLY when the
+// operator has bound to a non-loopback address (see HOST_IS_LOOPBACK), i.e. they have explicitly
+// opted into network access — the same decision that stands the anti-rebinding Host guard down
+// below. That lets the operator's own LAN/custom-host UI (e.g. http://192.168.x.x:3333/ui) talk to
+// its backend instead of being rejected as cross-origin, while a foreign origin (evil.com) still
+// mismatches the Host and is refused. On a loopback bind this is never consulted: the strict
+// loopback-only origin gate plus the Host guard remain fully in force, so no CSRF/rebinding gap.
+// URL.host is "hostname:port" with the default port (80/443) omitted — exactly how browsers set
+// BOTH the Origin and the Host header, so a genuine same-origin request compares equal.
+function isSameOriginAsHost(source: string | undefined, hostHeader: string | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!source || !hostHeader) return false;
+  try {
+    return new URL(source).host.toLowerCase() === hostHeader.trim().toLowerCase();
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 // CORS locked to the localhost UI origins ONLY. A same-origin fetch from the UI
 // (or a tool with no Origin like curl/CLI) is allowed; any other website's
 // Origin is rejected so the browser blocks it from reading our responses.
@@ -215,6 +234,8 @@ app.use((req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
   // No Origin AND no Referer → trusted local caller (curl/CLI/MCP). Allow.
   if (!source) return next();
   if (isLoopbackOrigin(source)) return next();
+  // #84: on a non-loopback (opted-in network) bind, also trust the operator's own same-origin UI.
+  if (!HOST_IS_LOOPBACK && isSameOriginAsHost(source, req.headers.host)) return next();
   res.status(403).json({
     error: 'Cross-origin request rejected',
     detail: 'This local API only accepts requests from the localhost UI, curl, or the CLI. A cross-origin (foreign-website) Origin/Referer was detected and blocked to prevent CSRF/drive-by command execution.',
@@ -4718,7 +4739,10 @@ export function broadcastEvent(event: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): vo
 const MAX_SSE_CLIENTS = 64;
 app.get('/api/events', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
   const origin = _req.get('origin');
-  if (origin && !isLoopbackOrigin(origin)) {
+  // #84: allow the operator's own same-origin UI on a non-loopback (opted-in) bind; foreign
+  // origins still fail the loopback check AND the Host match, so they remain rejected.
+  const sameOriginNetworkBind = !HOST_IS_LOOPBACK && isSameOriginAsHost(origin, _req.headers.host);
+  if (origin && !isLoopbackOrigin(origin) && !sameOriginNetworkBind) {
     res.status(403).json({
       error: 'Cross-origin event stream rejected',
       detail: 'The SSE feed may contain live mission/task/finding metadata and is only available to the localhost UI.',